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INTRODUCrIONIn the early 1990s, mainstream America discovered the environ-
ment.1 Growing political and media attention situated environmen-
tal concerns in the spotlight as a national priority requiring domestic
and global action. The heightened awareness also fostered a conser-
vation ethic that each individual could help protect our planet by tak-
ing action at home, in school, or work. Consumers found that they
could -bring about an extensive shift in environmental practices by in-
corporating their concerns into their purchasing decisions.2 Advertis-
ers, manufacturers, and marketers quickly perceived the shift in
attitudes toward greater environmental awareness and concern among
the general public.3 No longer were hard-core "greens"' the only seg-
ment of the population demanding environmentally benign products;
mainstream consumers had joined in as well.5 A sizeable portion of
*J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GEN. ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS
AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVTL. ADVERTISING 4-6
(1990) [hereinafter GREEN REPORT]; Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally
Friendly" Product Advertising: Its Future Requires New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 155, 156, 162-65 (1992) (noting a huge increase in environmental market-
ing in response to the rise in environmental consciousness among the general public);
Joanna L. Watman, Note, Whose Grass Is Greener? Green Marketing: Toward a Uni-
form Approach for Responsible Environmental Advertising, 3 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REP. 163, 164-67 (1992) (discussing the rise in consumer demand for environmentally
responsible products and the evolution of the green marketing trend). The success
surrounding Earth, Day 1990 facilitated the growth of environmentalism as a main-
stream issue. See, e.g., Casey Bukro, Shopping for an Ideal: Consumers Hungry for
'Recyclable' or 'Biodegradable' are Finding Their Environmental Diet Heavy on Am-
biguity, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1991, (Ecology Special Report 1991), at 24 (finding that
the growing popularity of Earth Day touched off a wave of environmental concerns in
the marketplace).
2. Bukro, supra note 1.
3. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
4. "Of, pertaining to, or supporting environmentalism (esp. as a political issue);
that belongs to or supports an ecological party; loosely, environmentalist, ecological."
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 811 (2d ed. 1989). The term has historically
been used to describe members of the green political party and politically active envi-
ronmentalists generally.
5. Cecilia Deck, Business Response to Earthly Concerns is Expected to Grow,
DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 29, 1990, at ID; Ecology Steering Shoppers, NEw ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 13, 1991, at Cl; John Holusha, Companies Try to Woo Cus-
tomers With Pro-Environment Image, TIMES UNION, Mar. 12, 1991, at B12, available
in WESTLAW, Papers File; Connie Koennen, Many Puttihg Environment at the Top
of Shopping List, BuFF. NEWS, Mar. 25, 1990, at El, available in WESTLAW, Papers
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consumers demanded environmentally-friendly products, and were
willing to pay more for these products.6
After noticing the consumer interest in purchasing "greener" prod-
ucts, manufacturers rushed to satisfy growing consumer demands.7
Many new products appeared at the marketplace touting environmen-
tally-friendly qualities and claims to capture the growing market.. In
the rush to capture the public's attention, many businesses bypassed
the lengthy process of creating new products by proclaiming the envi-
ronmental benefits of their pre-existing products.9 Some companies
also created products with environmentally-friendly characteristics.' 0
However, advertising claims for these products were often false or
misleading." For instance, many manufacturers claimed that their
File; Joyce Rosencrans, Shops Add Food for the Environmentally Minded, IN. POST,
Oct. 30, 1991, at 1C.
6. Bukro, supra note 1, at 24 (citing a J. Walter Thompson advertising survey in
1990, which found that "89[%],of consumers polled said they would choose a product
marked environmentally safe, and that 82[%] of them would pay more for such prod-
ucts"); see -also Robert A. Rankin, EPA, Tampax at Odds Over Marketing Claim,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 1991, at D5 (finding that up to 91% of consumers want
product labels to denote which items are environmentally benign); Terri Shaw The
Selling of 'Green'; Labels Use All the Buzz Words, But What Do They Mean?, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 1991, (Home), at 9 (surveying consumer misunderstanding over envi-
ronmental terms used to promote products).
7. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
8. Id. (noting that hundreds of products have been touted as environmentally
friendly and even more are being developed).9. See id. at 33 (noting that aerosol companies had claimed that products were
free of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) even though they were banned by the federal
government in 1978); Dick Rawe and Gary Rhodes, Naturalists, Business Battle, CIN.
POST, July 23, 1991, at 1A (noting that manufacturers heavily publicized products
which do not contain CFCs even though CFCs have largely been banned in the
United States since 1978); see also Carol Jouzaitis, Greenspeak Turns Out to be Hype
With Some Products, RECORD, Apr. 8, 1990, at B20, available in WESTLAW, Papers
File (questioning green claims generally).
10. See Raj Bal, Degradable Bags Help The Environment, USA TODAY, Mar. 16,
1990, at 12A (praising the creation of degradable trash bags to relieve landfill
concerns).
11. E.g., Shelby Gilje, Biodegradable Diapers: Composting Isn't Available, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at F5 (discussing efforts'by the Federal Trade Commission to
crack down on manufacturers advertising diapers as degradable); Martha M. Hamil-
ton, Seven States Sue Mobil Over Degradable Trash Bag Claims, WASH. POST, June 13,
1990, (Home), at B5 (reporting that seven state Attorneys General planned to fie
lawsuits against trash bag manufacturers for deceptively advertising trash bags as
degradable). Manufacturers claimed that other products were recyclable. These
products were actually very difficult to recycle and many recycling facilities were un-
able to handle the challenge. See generally Juice-Box Makers Settle Dispute Over Re-
cycling, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 29, 1991, at C13 (reporting that two juice-box
manufacturers agreed to discontinue false claims that containers were easily re-
cycled); Robert A. Rankin, supra note,6, (discussing claims that certain tampon appli-
cators were more ecologically sound); Carole Sugarman, Green Go the Grocers; A
Sample of What's in Store, WASH. PosT, May 16, 1990, (Food), at 1; Stevenson Swan-
son, White Castle Denied Recycling Label, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1993, (Chicagoland), at
3 (reporting FTC crackdown on claims that White Castle hamburger containers are
recyclable). See generally FTC Gives the Red Light to Some 'Green' Claims, NEW
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plastic products broke down in landfills.' 2 In fact, these products
broke down only in ideal conditions over an inordinately long period
of time, and in a condition not commonly found in most landfills.13
The barrage of environmental buzzwords and declarations led to tre-
mendous consumer confusion regarding the meaning of the claims. 14
A study of consumers' understanding of environmental terms re-
vealed that consumers were unable to define many terms, nor could
they grasp the nuances that differentiated similar terms.' 5 The study
revealed that "[m]any current and proposed environmental labeling
terms simply go whizzing by consumers." 6 The study found that the
most general terms were understandable, while more specific terms
generated confusion.' 7 This study suggests that the problem of :mis-
leading environmental advertising lies at least partially with the con-
sumers' unfamiliarity with more precise environmental definitions. 18
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 2, 1993, at E3 (discussing claims that certain card-
board containers are "environmentally friendly"); Study: 'Biodegradable' Claim False,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Mar. 6, 1991, at A2.
12. Minnesota Challenges Mobil's 'Degradable' Bags, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1990, at
3 (manufacturers accused of deceptive advertising after claiming the products were
degradable); Michael Parrish, P&G Agrees to Modify Its Disposable Diaper Ads, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at D3 (manufacturers prevented from advertising diapers as
degradable).
13. Gilje, supra note 11; Hamilton, supra note 11.
14. See Connie Koennen, Consumer Is Left Holding the Bag in Controversy Over
Biodegradability, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 11, 1990, at G13; Babette Morgan, It Isn't Easy
Being Green, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, July 8,. 1991, (Business), at 1; Plastics: Study
Casts Doubt That 'Biodegradable' Products Decompose More Quickly, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 1991, at 6D; see also Environmental Buyers Beware of 'Safe'
Labels, ROCKY M N NEWS, May 5, 1990, at 54 (giving examples of deficient defini-
tions: "recyclable," "non-toxic," "environment-friendly," and "environmentally
safe"); A Short Course in Eco-Speak, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, (Green Consumer
Guide), at 4 (giving examples of phrases consumers should wary of, including:
"degradable," "biodegradable," "photodegradable," "green," "natural," "nontoxic,"
"ozone-friendly," "recyclable," "recycled," "environmentally safe," and "safe for the
environment").
15. Do Consumers Understand Environmental Labeling Terminology?, GREEN
MARKETING REPORT, Jan. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 2662927, Green
Market Report File (page unavailable online). The scientific worth of the study has
been questioned since only a limited group was polled. The study was conducted
solely in Illinois among predominantly rural, middle-aged women. Id. The survey
does not claim to be nationally projectable. In addition, the questions asked were
open-ended. However, it is the only study to date conducted on consumers' under-
standing of these terms. See also Gary Levin, Too Green For Their Own Good; Sur-
vey Indicates Many Consumers Having a Hard Time Coping, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr.
12, 1993, at 29 (reporting a global survey which found a sense of helplessness in con-
sumers from developed countries due to a lack of clarity in environmental claims).
16.' Do Consumers Understand Environmental Labeling, Terminology?, supra note
15.
17. See id. The report discussed consumers' high understanding of the term "re-
cycled," but noted that consumers were not capable of correctly defining "re-usable"
or "recyclable."
18. See id.
1995] 9
300 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
Consumers were not the only ones to take notice of the environ-
mental marketing confusion.'9 These claims quickly gained the atten-
tion of state2 0 and federal2' regulators, resulting in a call for federal
environmental marketing regulations.22
The federal government, however, moved slowly in this area. Sev-
eral congressional attempts failed to create federal environmental ad-
vertising rules,2 3 and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") moved
slowly toward creating guidelines that covered permissible and imper-
missible conduct in environmental marketing.24 In response to the
federal regulatory vacuum, various states stepped in with environmen-
tal marketing statutes of their own.2 5
In 1992, a coalition of the Association of National Advertisers ("As-
sociation") and other commercial interest groups filed a suit against
the California Attorney General, challenging California's statute reg-
ulating the use of Various environmental terms in product advertising
19. "Environmental marketing" is also known as "green marketing." Environ-
mental marketing is all marketing designed to sell a product on the basis of the prod-
ucts environmental characteristics. The author makes no differentiation, and uses
"environmental marketing" solely for stylistic purposes.
20. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-11 (discussing how the situation came
to attention of state regulators and their early attempts to control the fraud); Downs,
supra note 1, at 174-76 (detailing the actions of state regulators); Eleven States Warn
Against False Ecological Claims, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 1991, at B7 (discussing the
plan of action by the Attorney General's Task Force to crack down on false advertis-
ing); Ingrid Sundstrum, 'Eco-Safe' Products? Humphrey Wary, STAR TRIB., Apr. 26,
1990, at 1D, available in WESTLAW, Papers File (reactions of Minnesota Attorney
General Hubert Humphrey 1II to misleading and confusing green marketing claims);
Brenda L. Wilson, States' Prosecutors Take On Firms' 'Green' Claims; Group Seeks to
End Misleading Labels, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 17, 1991, at A4 (detailing Attorneys
General task force objectives and actions).
21. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; 'Biodegradable' Sell Faces FTC Scrutiny,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1990, (Business), at 16; NancyRivera Brooks, FTC Investi-
gating Claims of Products' Ecological Safety, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1990, at 2D; Fed-
eral Probe Aimed at False Claims, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 1990, at 4D;
Product's Environmental Claims to Be Probed, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1990, at 1.
22. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 15; CALIFORNIA ATT'Y GEN. ET AL., THE
GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE. ENVIRONMENTAL AD-
VERTISING 1-4 (1991) [hereinafter GREEN REPORT II]; 'Green' Ad Standards Sought;
Report Urges Uniform Terms, CAP. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at 7A, available in
WESTLAW, Papers File; Michael Parrish, Federal 'Green' Ad Rules Proposed, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, (Business), at 3.
23. E.g., Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1990, S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990); Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991, H.R. 1408, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991, S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); National Recycling Markets Act of 1991, H.R. 2746, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); National Recycling Markets Act of 1991, S. 2363, 102d Cong., 1stSess. (1991);
National Waste Reduction, Recycling and Management Act, H.R. 3865, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); Materials Recycling Enhancement Act of 1991, S. 1473, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991). See also Downs, supra note 1, at 179-80.
24. FTC Guides For the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260.1 (1994). The guidelines were announced in 1992. Id.
25. See infra parts IIA and IIIA.
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and marketing.26 That statute, section 17508.5 of the California Busi-
ness and Professional Code ("Statute" or "section 17508.5"), regulates
commercial environmental marketing by defining several environ-
mental terms and prohibiting their use to represent product claims
unless the statutory definition is met.27 The interest groups claimed
that section 17508.5 violated their members' commercial speech
rights, a doctrine flowing from the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech.28 Both the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
statute.29
Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren30 highlighted
several difficulties inherent in state environmental marketing regula-
tions. National Advertisers illustrated that the most obvious difficulty
in regulating environmental marketing is the lack of uniform, national
standards.31 The case also raised problems posed by state-created def-
initions for environmental marketing terms and the public perception
of those definitions. Additionally, National Advertisers underscores
the concern that green marketing regulation hamstrings commercial
marketing without effectively advancing the state's environmental or
consumer protection interests. Finally, National Advertisers high-
lighted the consumer confusion resulting from the statute specifically
and environmental marketing in general.
This Note will analyze the California green marketing statute,
briefly survey various regulations adopted by other jurisdictions, and
propose an alternative solution to the current regulatory framework.
Part I briefly reviews the downfall of environmental marketing. Part
II discusses the California statute and its environmental consequences;
an overview of the commercial speech doctrine; the application of this
doctrine in National Advertisers; and the environmental consequences
of the Ninth Circuit's decision. Part III surveys the various state and
federal approaches to the regulation of environmental marketing.
Part IV examines federal food labeling requirements. Finally, Part V
extrapolates from the food labeling requirements promulgated by the
26. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (Feb. 23, 1995);
Miranda Ewell, Green Marketing Law in Court Top Story; A Group of Industries
Challenges the State Environmental Advertising Rules, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Sept. 18, 1992, at 3B, available in WESTLAW, Papers File. See also infra part II.
27. See infra notes 65-66.
28. See infra note 98 and accompanying discussion.
29. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 726 (9th
Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995).
30. Id.
31. E.g., Howard Schlossberg, Report Says Environmental Marketing Claims Level
Off, MARKETING NEWS, May 24, 1993, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library (re-
porting that the EPA blamed the "chaotic nature" of environmental marketing regu-
lations as a leading cause of declining environmental marketing claims).
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Food and Drug Administration and proposes a similar framework for
product labeling of environmental claims.
I. THE FALL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING
The barrage of environmental claims made by green marketers in
the early 1990s ranged from "biodegradable diapers" to "recyclable
hamburger containers."32 The rush to satisfy the growing demand for
environmental products led to tremendous pressures on manufactur-
ers to offer products touting environmental claims, whether accurate
or not, to capture a segment of the consumer market.33 As a result,
regulatory authorities and environmental groups have often stepped
in to correct glaring inaccuracies and misleading environmental adver-
tising claims.34
The first action was taken by a task force, comprised of ten state
Attorneys General, who conducted public hearings on the problems
of environmental marketing. 35 Specifically, the task force focused on
the prevalence of misleading and deceptive environmental marketing
practices36 by studying the potential for abuse in environmental
marketing.37
The task force found many instances of environmental advertising
irregularities. The task force published their findings in a document
entitled the "Green Report," which detailed how environmental mar-
keting had become an important factor in consumer purchases and the
growing number of "trivial, confusing or even misleading" claims. 38
They determined that both environmental groups and businesses de-
sired standard definitions for environmental claims, both to create a
"level playing field" and to "reduce for both consumers and business
the ... confusion about the meaning of environmental claims. ' '3" The
task force recommended the establishment of uniform definitions by
32. See supra note 11. But see ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND AND McDoN-
ALD'S CORP., WASTE REDUCTION TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT (1991) (genuine at-
tempts made through the joint efforts of McDonald's and the Environmental Defense
Fund to reduce waste flow) [hereinafter EDF REPORT].
33. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
34. See supra note 11.
35. See Stephen Gardner, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of Environmen
tal Marketing Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 31, 52-58 (1991); Michael Parrish, Federal
'Green' Ad Rules Proposed Marketing, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at D3. The state
Attorneys General represented California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New York, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In May 1991, Tennessee
joined the original ten states in a revision of the original Green Report. GREEN RE-
PORT II, supra note 22.
36. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-7.
37. Id.
* 38. Id. at 1; see also supra notes 1-6, 8, 11.
39. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
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the federal government,4 0 and sought to increase the sharing of infor-
mation between the offices of the state Attorneys General.4
Since the federal government was slow to enactenvironmental mar-
keting regulations,42 regulations were enacted in various jurisdictions,
sometimes in response to work of the task force's findings, with the
aim of curbing incorrect and inaccurate environmental claims. 3
These regulations represented different approaches, to the problem,
and surpassed the laws concerning false and deceptive advertising.4
Although states have successfully prosecuted several environmental
claims generally,4 5 they nevertheless sought to specifically regulate en-
vironmental advertising." The various statutes that resulted
presented a confusing array of regulations to businesses. 7
Finally, the FTC issued guidelines for environmental claims, 8 but
did not issue binding regulations. A step that carries important impli-
40. Id. at 20-23; GREEN REPORT II, supra note 22, at 1.
41. GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 15; see also Linda M. Harrington, FTC
Urged to Regulate 'Green' Ads, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1991, at 17.
42. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying discussion.
43. See infra parts IIA and III; Peter J. Tarsney, Regulation of Environmental Mar-
keting: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 533, 536-38 (1994). California and Indiana enacted similar laws after
the Green Report findings were made public. See infra parts IIA and IIIAL. Rhode
Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire enacted environmental marketing laws
before the Green Report, but during the early days of environmental marketing. See
infra .part III. The FTC finally issued guidelines in mid-1992. See infra note 356.
44. See, e.g., Glenn Israel, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: Na-
tional Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
303, 312-15 (1993).
.45. Gardner, supra note 35, at 46-50 (eight actions against allegedly deceptive
practices pursued by various states); Ciannat M. Howett, Note, The "Green Labeling"
Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of Environmental Product
Claims, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 401 (1992) (examples of settlement agreements pursued
by state Attorneys General); Israel, supra note 44, at 309-17 (brief overview of state
and federal deceptive trade practice laws and civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") actions by citizen plaintiffs); Todd A. Rathe, Note, The Gray
Area of the Green Market: Is It Really Environmentally Friendly? Solutions to Confu-
sion Caused By Environmental Advertising, 17 J. CORP. L. 419, 434-39 (1992) (discuss-
ing case-by-case adjudication through general state deceptive advertising laws and
disadvantages of this method). But see David F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental
Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the "Gray" Behind the
"Green", 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 999-1001 (1993) (arguing that state deceptive advertis-
ing statutes are not sufficient due to vague interpretations and low success rates).
46. Israel, supra note 44, at 320; Rathe, supra note 45, at 440-41; Welsh, supra note
45, at 1000.
47. See infra partIII.
48. See infra note 356. There is some question whether the ]FTC, which regulates
product claims, or the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which regulates
environmental issues, should be regulating environmental marketing. The issue falls
partially within the purview of both federal agencies, and yet neither has specific con-
gressional authorization to regulate, environmental marketing. For a discussion of the
division of authority and expertise on the specific problems and possible solutions, see
Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling,
10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993); Downs, supra note 1; Paul H. Luehr, Comment,
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cations, because California enacted a safe harbor provision that en-
compassed any FTC regulations, but not FTC guidelines.49 The FTC
guidelines do not preempt the various state regulations governing en-
vironmental marketing.5 °
Among the mosaic of regulations enacted by the states, by far the
most stringent is California's. 51 Then-Attorney General John Van de
Kamp lobbied for the law,52 which set forth definitions for several en-
-vironmental characteristics and regulated their use in describing any
product.53 The Statute dismayed various manufacturers, marketers,
and advertisers ("marketers"). 54 The marketers' grievance was not
that the legislature had defined several environmental terms; the mar-
keters themselves had already called for standard guidelines.55
Rather, marketers opposed the statute because they believed it was
antagonistic to national advertising campaigns.5 6 In addition, they al-
leged that the definitions were capricious and harsh.57 Facing the de-
Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulat-
ing Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENvL. L. & POL'Y 311 (1992); Welsh,
supra note 45.
49. See infra notes 69-70 and 324-25 and accompanying text.
50. FTC Guides For the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260.1 (The guidelines "provide the basis for voluntary compliance. . . by members
of industry."). However, some states have used the guidelines as a safe-harbor or as
the basis for substantive law. See infra notes 323-24'and 356.
51. See Rathe, supra note 45, at 441-42; Tarsney, supra note 43, at 538.
52. Cf Michael Parrish, Environmental Claims Bill Goes to Governor, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1990, at D2 ("outgrowth of a fact-finding meeting... by attorney generals
[sic]").
53. See infra notes 65-66.
54. See, e.g., John Accola, State Regs May Clip Businesses' Green Marketing,
ROCKY MT. NEWS, Nov. 14, 1991, at 58 (citing criticism of California's and Rhode
Island's regulations for being too harsh on environmental marketing claims and for
creating inconsistencies between differing states in regulating environmental
marketing).
55. Susan McKearney Bryan Industry Group Calls for Rules on 'Green' Ads,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1991, at F3, available in WESTLAW, Papers File; Ellen
Carlson, Nuggets, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1991, at 4E, available
in WESTLAW, Papers File; Michael Parrish, Industry to Unveil Its Idea of 'Green'
Marketing Rules, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, Business Section, at 1; Cheryl Wetzstein,
FTC Urged to Set Guide Lines for Ecological Claims, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at
C4, available in WESTLAW, Papers File. See also ANA Endorses International Envi-
ronmental Claims Code, GREEN MARKETING REPORT, June 2, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, GRMKTAL File.
56. See Watman, supra note 1, at 168; Rich Heidorn Jr., It's Earth Friendly? Prove
It: Labels Catch Eye of N.J. Agency, PHILA. INOUIRER, Dec. 16, 1991, at B1; Vocabu-
lary of Environmental Terms Proposed, PITr. PRESS, Feb. 14, 1991, at A7.
57. Green Machine Stalls; Firms Face Backlash on Product Claims, SUN SENTINEL,
Dec. 31, 1990; (Weekly Business), at 4, available in WESTLAW, Papers File (" 'The
major manufacturers have, backpedaled because they are leery of getting caught in
making claims that through no fault of their own they can't substantiate. ... ' ").
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struction of many environmental claims, the marketers sought to
enjoin enforcement of the statute.58
With the marketers' and regulators' energy focused on attempting
to shape the emerging regulatory framework, it seemed that the con-
sumer was somewhat forgotten. Indeed, the consumers' exuberance
for environmental marketing appears to have faded.59 The recession
of the early 1990s, premium prices, and advertiser confusion have
been blamed for consumers' lack of enthusiasm over environmental
marketing.60 No one is certain if environmental marketing was merely
a trend or has hit a snag.6  The decline in environmentally-driven
purchases could be permanent or temporary. But one thing is for cer-
tain: in the current regulatory Climate, whether due to the regulations,
the recession, or lack of public concern, 62 consumers have lost their
enthusiasm for purchasing environmentally benign products.63 And
with the demise of environmental marketing, the public has lost a
powerful tool for grass roots environmental action.
II. ASSOCIATION OFNATIONAL ADVERTISERS V. LUNGREN
A. California Business and Professional Code Section 17508.5
1. Statutory Provisions
At issue in National Advertisers64 was section 17508.5 of the Califor-
nia Business and Professional Code.65 The California statute .regu-
58. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23,
1993).
.59. Bruce Horovitz, 'Green' Honeymoon is, Over; Analysts Say Consumers Are
Cooling to Environmental Products, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at D1; David E. Ka-
lish, Marketers Put 'Green' Claims on Hold After Consumer Protest, CAP. TIMES, Jan.
1, 1991, at 6B, available in WESTLAW, Papers File; Carol Smith, Recession Has Only
Slowed Green Growth, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 29, 1992, at B8; Wendy
Warren, Price, Not 'Green,' Sells in Midlands, STATE, Aug. 23, 1992, at 1H, available
in WESTLAW, Papers File; cf Michael Parrish, Just Call Him the Green Marketeer,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at D1 (environmental marketeer believes that problem is
price, not consumer commitment); Guy Webster, -Going for the Green; Businesses
Cast Environmental Net, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1993, at F1 (businesses still mar-
keting environmental claims).
60. See Israel, supra note 44, at 306-09; Schlossberg, supra note 31; Smith, supra
note 59; Warren, supra note 59.
61. See supra note 59; see also Green Machine Stalls; Firms Face Backlash on
Product Claims, supra note 57 (discussing how firms have become leery of making
environmental claims).
62. See supra note 60.
63. See Horovitz, supra note 59;-Warren, supra note 59.
64. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal.
1992); aff'd, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23,
1995).
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Ann. Supp. 1995). This section
provides:
It is unlawful for any person to represent that any consumer good which it
manufactures or distributes is "ozone friendly," or any like term which con-
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lates the commercial use of five environmental terms: "ozone
friendly," "biodegradable," "photodegradable," "recycled," and "re-
cyclable." 66 These terms may not be used to describe any consumer
product unless the state's definition is met.67 Advertisers run the risk
of criminal prosecution for violating the terms of this section.68IThe statute does provide a safe harbor for advertisers: if the con-
sumer product does not meet the definitions the state has set forth in
section 17508.5, but instead conforms to the "definitions established in
trade rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission... ,"69 the rep-
resentation will not run afoul of the statute.70 While the safe harbor
notes that stratospheric ozone is not being depleted, "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable," "recyclable," or "recycled" unless that consumer good
meets the definitions contained in this section, or meets definitions estab-
lished in trade rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission.
66. Id. which states:
For the purposes of this section, the following words have the following
meanings:
(a) "Ozone friendly," or any like term which connotes that stratospheric
ozone is not being depleted, means that any chemical or material released
into the environment as a result of the use or production of a product will
not migrate to the stratosphere and cause unnatural and accelerated deterio-
ration of ozone.
(b) "Biodegradable" means that a material has the proven capability to
decompose in the most common environment where the material is disposed
within one year through natural biological processes into nontoxic carbona-
ceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide.
(c) "Photodegradable" means that a material has the proven capability to
decompose in the most common environment where the material is disposed
within one year through physical processes, such as exposure to heat and
light, into nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide.
(d) "Recyclable" means that an article's contents can be conveniently re-
cycled, as defined in Section 40180 of the Public Resources Code; in every
county in California with a population over 300,000 persons. F6r the pur-
poses of this subdivision, "conveniently recycled" shall not mean that a con-
sumer good may be recycled in a convenience zone as defined in Section
14509.4 of the Public Resources Code.
(e), "Recycled" means that an article's contents contain at least 10 per-
cent, by weight, post-consumer material, as defined in subdivision (b) of Sec-
tion 12200 of the Public Contract Code.
(f) "Consumer good" means any article which is used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(g) For the purposes of this section, a wholesaler or retailer who does not
initiate a representation by advertising or by placing the representation on a
package shall not be deemed to have made the representation.
See also Parrish, supra note 52.
67. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5. See supra note 56.
68. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17534 provides: "Any person, firm, corporation,
partnership or association or any employee who violates this chapter is guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id. See id. § 17508.5; National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 737; Parrish,
Environmental Claims Bill Goes to Governor, supra note 52. The criminal aspects of
the statute are beyond the scope of this Note.
69. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (emphasis added).
70. However, the Federal Trade Commission has not established rules, but instead
has established guides. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying discussion.
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provision allows for conformance with FTC "rules," the FTC has is-
sued "guidelines" instead of "rules." The FTC guidelines therefore do
not, fall within the safe harbor provision.
There are potential problems with California's statute from the
marketer's viewpoint, several of which were cogently set forth in a
letter from then-Governor George Deukmajian. 71 The governor's let-
ter stated, in relevant part:
I am... concerned with the definition of "recyclable" which is de-
fined as meaning the article can be conveniently recycled in every
county in California with a population over 300,000. This term is
impermissibly vague to be the basis of a criminal statute because it
does not clearly state what is necessary to meet the test of conven-
ience. Other definitions in the bill are too vague or overly strict.
Without specific definitions, manufacturers may be chilled from
providing any labels, even where the packaging is more environ-
mentally friendly than other packaging. This would be contrary to
the goal that we all share to encourage packaging that is recyclable
or environmentally sound.7 2
Despite his reservations, the governor nonetheless signed the bill
based on assurances by the Statute's drafter that "cleanup legislation"
would be forthcoming within the next year.73 The cleanup legislation,
however, resulted in only minor changes.74
2. California's Environmental Interest: A Lost Opportunity
The Statute fails to effectively promote California's interest.75 In
this regard, the Statute contains two primary defects. First, the Stat-
ute puts the burden of monitoring recycling facilities and their ability
to handle different types of materials upon manufacturers.76 Since the
Statute requires that virtually every recycling facility in the state must
be able to recycle the product, the state is requiring marketers to en-
sure that the state's facilities are up to date before marketing a prod-
uct as recyclable. Second, the Statute prevents marketers from
including clarifying or additional' information in their product repre-
sentations. By preventing the inclusion of such information, consum-
ers receive minimal information. This reduces the quality of the
consumer decision-making process. For instance, a label claiming that
71. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (West
Ann. Supp. 1995); see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying discussion.. A preliminary
difficulty is that the statute contains no provisions concerning goods already in the
stream of commerce. Id. This problem has long ceased to be aconcern since the
statute is several years old.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Ann. Supp. 1995); Henry Wein-
stein, Court Upholds Law Restricting 'Green' Labeling, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at
23.
75. But see infra notes 273-78.
76. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(d).
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the product is "recyclable" may only be recyclable in a limited area.
Additional information could be added to clarify the "recyclable"
claim.77 This would allow the marketer to gain the benefits of a lim-
ited environmental claim while preventing the deception that pro-
vided the impetus for promulgating section 17508.5. Consumers will
have the pertinent information, while the state will not have to be
concerned about its citizens being deceived.
These statutory defects lead to the conclusion that the California
legislature's response to its recycling problem is flawed. Section
17508.5 does not effectively assist recycling efforts and places a heavy
burden upon manufacturers. Ultimately, the state is responsible, for
waste collection.78 Since recycling programs are of great assistance in
reducing the state's problems of solid waste storage, the state is also
responsible for recycling facilities.79 Despite the commendable goal of
waste ieduction, which section 17508.5 is attempting to further, it fails
to decrease the amount of waste dumped into landfills. This is be-
cause the statute does not allow for the inclusion of further informa-
tion on products or advertisements that would assist consumers in
their recycling efforts. This information would detail exactly how or
where the product was recyclable. Without further explanation, con-
sumer efforts are frustrated by the complexity of recycling programs
or they may simply dump all products that they consider recyclable
into their recycling bins. Many products are recyclable only in limited
pilot programs or suffer from some other defect that renders the prod-
uct non-recyclable for that area.8"
Further, the Statute does not pressure manufacturers to increase
the recyclability of their products. Instead, the Statute frustrates cor-
porate efforts to increase the feasibility of new recycling programs,
since there is no feasible approach to create such a new and expensive
technology without a smaller pilot program. Clarifying language
should be sufficient to alert consumers that the manufacturer is ac-
tively creating the technology to recycle the product, but that this
technology is not widely available.81
In enacting the environmental marketing regulations, the legislature
was probably reacting to the problem of marketers who generally ad-
vertise their products as "recyclable" when they are actually recycl-
77. See infra note 84.
78. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 4510.
79. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 41300.
80. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18.
81. Closing a large market such as California will decrease the number of products
sold to consumers who support companies that are developing recycling. technology,
and will also decrease the number of units that can be recovered for use in pilot
recycling programs. On a smaller scale, the statute diminishes the likelihood that a
company within California will be able to promote a novel recycling program. Since
consumers will not be aware of the new program, they will not be able to return used
packaging or products to the pilot program. Such restrictions will needlessly increase
the difficulty of developing recycling programs for specific products.
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able only in experimental or pilot programs.82 These programs are
usually in distant (often out-of-state) regions, 3 which poses a problem
because consumers may purchase the product believing that the prod-
uct is readily recyclable locally. To promote a product as "recyclable"
when only one facility in the entire country can successfully recycle it,
is, at the very least, somewhat misleading to consumers.
Consumers have other motivations in purchasing recyclable goods.
The consumer may wish to patronize producers who are actively
working toward improving the recyclability of their products or who
take other steps to improve the environment. Manufacturers of prod-
ucts that are potentially recyclable or are more ecologically sound
could provide clarifying language on their product labels to offer con-
sumers such information.' Under the Statute, however, marketers
would not be able to advertise their products as "recyclable" unless
every county in California with a population of more than 300,000
conveniently recycles that item.8" This applies even when clarifying
language is used.86 Thus, manufacturers are forced to abandon their
recyclability campaigns unless every applicable county recycles that
item. 7 This requirement therefore stifles efforts to promote environ-
mentally sound products and denies consumers living in communities
that can effectively recycle a product the information to do so.
Consequently, the Statute stunts the growth of recycling programs
and denies consumers the clarifying language that could remove much
82. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 41-42.
83. Cf James Mayer, Recycling Symbol Misused, Groups Say, OREGONIAN, Oct.
29, 1991, at C16, available in WESTLAW, Papers File (explaining how environmental
groups criticized recycling program for advertising products as recyclable when re-
cycling plant was not within Portland).
84. See infra notes 253 and 438 and accompanying discussion; see also supra note
11. For instance, a label could read "Package is recyclable in a limited area. To find
out if this product is recyclable in your area, call 1-800-XXX-XXXX."
85. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(d).
86. Id.
87. Manufacturers should not be able to claim that a product is recyclable, for
instance, if such a claim would be false, misleading, or confusing. Clarifying language
should be required if a product is recyclable in only a limited manner or geographic
area. However, preventing clarifying language will hinder the growth of new re-
cycling programs by preventing consumers from receiving information about new pro-
grams. If consumers are not aware of the fledgling programs, they cannot support
them through either their purchases or their voluntary participation in the pilot pro-
grams. In addition, consumers are prevented from receiving information about the
program. Without this new information, consumers are not able to effect beneficial
changes in their local recycling programs. See JOSEPH L. BLAST ET AL., Eco-SANITy:
A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTALISM 195-96 (1994) (discussing how
"information blackouts" lead to detrimental environmental decisions).
The statute does allow certain narrow claims to be made. See EDF REPORT, supra
note 32, at 79-118. However, the statute eliminates the majority of environmental
claims. The problem with the statute is not that it favors certain marketers over
others, but rather that it eliminates terms consumers are familiar with while providing
no more information, and often less, than is currently available.
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of the confusion.' The effect of the Statute thus contravenes one of
its major goals: to remove the consumers' confusion regarding re-
cycling availability. This Statute does not effectively assist consumers,
and instead frustrates their desire to recycle. Perhaps consumers will
take out their frustrations that certain products "are not recyclable"
by purchasing only recyclable products, as the Ninth Circuit suggested
in National Advertisers.89 Consumers may instead distance themselves
from recycling in general, especially when only one brand meets the
terms of the Statute. 90
The irony is that the marketers are being penalized for providing
recyclable products, which is purportedly in the state's interest. 91 This
is not to say that the Statute is wholly ineffectual. It does help reduce
glaring abuses by manufacturers making unfounded environmental
claims about their products. However, the statutory failure in denying
the use of clarifying language about claims on the label or in the ad-
vertisement of a product92 defeats the goal of providing increased con-
sumer information.93 While there is certainly a need to prevent claims
from being "clarified" by misleading or confusing terms, the Statute
bans manufacturers from providing helpful information. Simply per-
mitting clarifying language would remove a major infirmity in the
Statute.94
These deficiencies, along with the confusion generated by differing
state statutes, led the Association of National Advertisers to'file suit
in California. Businesses opposed the Statute because it prevented
many firms from truthfully advertising their products as beneficial to
the environment9s and threw the regulatory requirements of national
88. The Attorney General argued that the district court should read the statute as
allowing qualifying language. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 758 n.12. The dis-
trict court did not reach the issue, but questioned the validity of such a reading. Id.
The state abandoned the argument on appeal. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 740
(Noonan, J., dissenting). The argument would effectively rewrite the statute. Id.
89. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 733; see supranotes 44-46 and accompanying
text.
90. If this brand is low in quality or high in cost, consumers will choose another
product. Smith, supra note 59.
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying discussion.
92. See.infra notes 253 and 438. "Clarifying language" is the language thatmakes a
potentially misleading claim more reasonable. For instance, "This product is recycl-
able." The claim is correct, but may be misleading unless additional information is
provided. For an example of the clarifying language that could be used in this in-
stance, see supra note 84.
93. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Allowing clarifying language would
remove a major statutory infirmity. However, both the courts and the California leg-
islature have resisted such a change. The proposed change would not remove all infir-
mities in the statute, but would allow section 17508.5 to pass the commercial speech
test more easily. This does not mean that the reformulated statute would be the most
effective manner of regulating environmental marketing. See infra part V.
95. See supra notes 49-51.
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marketers into disorder and confusion.96  In addition, businesses
charged that the Statute is an onerous burden On their ability to effec-
tively communicate, with the, public.97
The Association alleged that the Statute violated-the commercial
speech doctrine of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.98
The Association also asserted that the regulation was unconstitution-
ally vague,99 specifically the statutory definitions of "ozone friendly"
and "recyclable." 1 ° The District Court agreed only that the definition
of "recyclable" failed the test for vagueness. 0 1 Since the Statute regu-
lated the ability of manufacturers to make claims "concerning . . .
commercial transactions,"102 the court tested the Statute under the
commercial speech doctrine. 10 3
B. Commercial Speech Generally
Commercial speech is defined as speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction."'" Essentially, this definition en-
compasses most product representations, either in advertising or on
96. Id.
97. Thisincludes both consumers and non-purchasing members of the public. See
Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 751-53 (N.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23,
1995).
98. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amend-
ment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The commercial
speech doctrine is an outgrowth of the freedom of speech that in recent years has
become an increasingly consequential issue. See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-14, at 890-904 (2d ed. 1988); 4 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE, §§ 20.26-.31, at 153-96 (2d ed. 1992). In 1976, the Court extended First
Amendment protection of speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).. Virginia Pharmacy was the first case that acknowledged that commercial
speech was protected by the First Amendment. However, the doctrine did not gain
substance until Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
.New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). After Central Hudson, commercial speech became an
important tool for marketers who challenged governmental actions that restricted any
attempts to market products.
99. National Advertisers, 809' F. Supp. at 759-762.
100. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(a) & (d).
101. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 759.
102. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978),,reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 883 (1978).
103. In upholding the district court, the court of appeals held that the speech at
issue met the test for commercial speech set out in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463, U.S. 60 (1983). National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 728 (9th Cir. 1994). The
Bolger characteristics are: (1) advertising format; (2) reference to a specific product;
and (3) the underlying economic motive of the speaker. Id.
104. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455 ("Expres-
sion concerning purely commercial transactions .... "); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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labels. Until 1976, this type of speech was not considered to warrant
First Amendment protection.'0 Thus, unlike other forms of pro-
tected speech, commercial speech traditionally has been subject to
'government regulation, 1' 6 and has been provided lesser protection
than other types of constitutionally guaranteed speech. 10 7 However,
since 1980, this lesser protection has not meant that commercial
speech is without value. As the Supreme Coui't has repeatedly stated
in recent years:
[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of consumer
information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his inter-
est in the day's most urgent political debate .... [T]he free flow of
commercial information is indispensable ... tothe proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system... [and] to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. 0 8
1. The Creation of the Central Hudson Test
The dominant commercial speech .case is Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 109 which
considered New York State's prohibition on advertising by electric
utilities promoting the use of electricity, to reduce energy demand
during the energy crisis in the 1970s." 0 Until shortly before the case
arose, the Court consistently denied commercial speech any First
Amendment protection,"' but was slowly reconsidering granting pro-
tection to commercial speech in the 1970s.112
271 (6th ed. 1991) ("speech that advertises a product or service for profit or for busi-
ness purpose").
105. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881
(1977). See generally TRIBE, supra note 98; NOVAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 98.
106. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
107. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
108. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763-65 (1976); see also Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at i797-98; Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985) (The "free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regula-
tors the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the mis-
leading, and the harmless from the harmful.").
109. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Court first gave limited protection to commercial
speech. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748; see supra note 79. Commercial speech anal-
ysis essentially did not move forward until the test announced in Central Hudson.
110. Three years later, after the national energy crisis had abated, the Commission
extended the advertising ban. The ban divided advertising into two categories: pro-
motional (defined as "advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility serv-
ices") and institutional/informational (defined as "all advertising not clearly intended
to promote sales."). Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559-60. All promotional advertising
was banned. Id. While acknowledging the distinction was not ideal, the Commission
elected to' continue the restriction because it would likely further conservation. Id.
111. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
112. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758 ("There can be no question that in past
decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is
unprotected.").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Central Hudson to decide
whether the government could place such a blanket'restriction on util-
ities preventing them from advertising.113 Focusing on how much pro-
tection commercial speech warranted, 1 4 the Court developed a four-
part test to govern when and how commercial speech may be
regulated."
5
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to' come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest. 1
6
Hence, for a restriction on commercial speech to pass constitutional
muster, the restriction must conform to all four prongs of the Central
Hudson test.
In Central Hudson, there was no allegation that the .affected speech
was "either inaccurate or relate[d] to unlawful activity."" 7 New York
offered two interests in supporting its ban on advertising by utilities.'"
First, the state claimed there was a state and national interest in en-
ergy conservation. Second, the state alleged that promotional adver-
tising would have "aggravate[d] inequities caused by the failure to
base the utilities' rates on marginal cost.""' 9 The Court found that
both interests were substantial, and therefore the second prong was
met.
120
• The Court proceeded to the third prong, which considered whether
the regulation directly advanced the state's interests.' 2 ' The Court
held that the relationship between the advertising ban and the state's
second interest was "tenuous" and "remote."'12 2 However, the Court
found that the state's interest in conserving energy was directly ad-
vanced by the advertising ban. 123
113. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
114. Id. at 563-64.
115. Id. at 566.
116. Id.
117. Id. The government clearly may impose regulations to prevent false, decep-
tive, or misleading commercial speech. Id. at 563-64 ("The government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than inform it . . . .");
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 ("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has
never been protected for its own sake.").
118. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568. The Court found that commercial speech
was protected by the First Amendment even in a monopoly market. Id. at 566-68.
119. Id. at 568.
120. Id. at 568-69.
121. Id.'at 569.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also MD II Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, Tex., 28 F.3d 492 (5th
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing substantial burden of Central Hudson's fourth prong).
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The Court invalidated the statute under the fourth prong, 124 which
measures whether the restriction is not "more extensive than neces-
sary to serve [the state interest].' 12 The Court held that the regula-
tion's complete ban on advertising was too broad, since it suppressed
information that would not have increased overall energy demand,
and because the state was unable to demonstrate that a more limited
regulation would be ineffective. 126
,2. Clarifying the Central Hudson Test
a. Illegal Activities and Misleading Speech
At the outset of the Central Hudson test, the inquiry focuses on
whether the speech "concern[s] lawful activity and [is] not
misleading."' 27
Commercial speech concerning -unlawful activities does not enjoy
any First Amendment protection. 28 The corollary to this principle is
that advertising legal activities cannot be prohibited by the govern-
ment.129 However, the government may regulate such speech in cer-
tain instances. 3 °
The cases concerning speech that regulates or prohibits advertising
relating to illegal activities are relatively straightforward. If an activity
is legal, the government may not ban commercial speech relating to
that activity unless it is misleading.3 '
124. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71.
125. Id. at 566:
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489
(1982) (ordinance requiring license to sell items designed to be used in conjunction
with illegal drugs; speech is unprotected because it proposes an illegal activity and
government may regulate or ban the activity altogether), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950
(1982); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388 (1973) (newspaper advertisement violated ordinance piohibiting sex discrimina-
tion and therefore lost commercial speech protection), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881
(1973); see also United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1994) (illegal relabel-
ing of pacemaker caused defendant to lose commercial speech claim); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
video descrambling devices illegal and therefore they enjoyed no commercial speech
protection).
129. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (conviction overturned for newspaper
publisher whose paper carried advertisement for firm that arranged for legal abor-
tions); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 43i U.S. 678 (1977) (Court struck
down prohibition on advertising of contraceptives); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (statute prohibited advertisement of prescription drug prices, but Court holds
this activity protected); Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1983) (Fifth Circuit panel invalidated statutes and
regulations on liquor advertising), aff'd on reh'g, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
130. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
131. But see Posadas v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). In
Posadas, the Court upheld a statute which forbade casino advertising which was di-
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Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection only
if the speech is not misleading.132  Misleading speech, however,
presents a more difficult question. The Court has distinguished be-
tween speech that is "inherently" misleading and that which is "poten-
tially" misleading.133 States may regulate speech that is inherently
misleading, and may even prohibit such speech altogether.3 Speech
that is potentially misleading may be regulated, but may not be
rected to the local population. Id. at 348. Advertising directed toward tourists was
permitted. Id. at 335-36. The Court reasoned that "the greater power to completely
ban [the activity] necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising." Id. at 345-
46. While the statute was not a complete ban, the Court's language implies thatwhen
the power exists to ban an activity, especially a yice activity, the government will have
enormous leeway in later prongs of the Central Hudson test. See also Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (upheld statutory ban on ciga-
rette advertising by any electronic medium that comes under control of FTC), aff'd
without opinion Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
It is unclear to what extent this "greater includes the lesser" standard applies. For
instance, the power to ban gambling entirely does not include the power to ban dis-
cussions of the political merits of such an action. But cf United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2704 (1993) (upholding federal statute which prevents
radio stations in states that forbid lotteries from advertising lotteries of other states
since "Congress might have . . . ban[ned] all radio or television lottery
advertisements").,
132. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
133. In re R.M.J., 455'U.S. 191, 203 (1982). RM.J. involved a Missouri Supreme
Court rule regulating advertising by lawyers.. The rule restricted the content of any
advertising to certain strictly defined categories. The Court found that the "potential
for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context of advertising profes-
sional services." Id.
The Court has dealt with professional advertising on numerous occasions. See Iba-
nez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy,
114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (lawyer who was reprimanded for engaging in "false, deceptive,.
and misleading" advertising by truthfully referring to her credentials as Certified Pub-
lic Accountant ("CPA") and Certified Financial Planner ("CFP") in advertising for
law firm was engaged in protected activity); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (Court overturned attorney reprimand for adver-
tising as a specialist); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (Court overturned rule
that CPAs could not solicit business in-person); Shapero v. Kentucky'Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466,488-91 (1988) (Court overturns state prohibitions against lawyers employing
targeted, direct-mail advertising); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 676-77 (1985) (state may not ban lawyers from advertising in newspaper
where advertisement contained legal advice); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (state could regulate attorney who
solicited accident victims where potential harm to public is great); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyer's letter which contained a solicitation for non-profit legal or-
ganization is protected by the commercial speech doctrine); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (Court invalidates rule prohibiting attorney advertising).
134. Id. ("[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that
in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restric-
tions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely."); see Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (upholding complete ban on trade names in optometrist's adver-
tisements, since trade names lack intrinsic meaning).
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banned completely unless the speech cannot be presented in a non-
deceptive manner.135
In Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Illi-
nois,136 a lawyer was reprimanded for holding himself out as a "spe-
cialist." The lawyer had been certified by the National Board of Trial
Advocacy, and stated this at the top of his letterhead. 37 An Illinois
Code of Professional Responsibility provision prevented lawyers from
using specialty designations except in the field of patent, trademark,
or admiralty. 138
The case turned on the designation of his speech as either inher-
ently or potentially misleading. The Court rejected the contention
that the speech was inherently misleading.139 The designation as a
specialist was not only true, but also verifiable. 140 The Court also
drew a distinction between "statements of opinion or quality and
statements of objective facts that may support an inference of
quality."141
The Court recognized that some consumers may assume that the
fitness of a specialist exceeds that of other members of the bar, and
that if the certifying organization failed to inquire into the lawyer's
fitness, the statement could be misleading while factually correct. 42
However, the Court found that the certifying qualifications were ob-
jectively clear, and thus, not misleading.' 4  Finally, the Court rejected
the finding of the Illinois Supreme Court that the placement of the
designation of specialist in proximity to the identification of the states
in which the lawyer was admitted conveyed the impression of an offi-
cial state action. 44
The specialist designation Was. also alleged to be potentially mis-
leading.145 The Court acknowledged that the designation might "not
be understood fully by some readers,"'146 but compared the situation
to others in which the Court upheld the rights of attorneys to adver-
tise.' 47 The Court restated its position that "the particular state rule
135. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 ("[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition
on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of prac-
tice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive."); see also
Bates, 433 U.S. at'374-75.
136. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
137. Id at 96.
138. Id. at 97 (citing Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility).
139. Id at 100-01.
140. Id. at 100.
141. Id. at 101.
142. Id. at 102.
143. Id.
144. Id at 103.
145. Id. at 106.
146. Id
147. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (targeted mailing);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (potential confusion
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restricting lawyers' advertising is 'broader than necessary to prevent
the perceived evil.' "148
While the specific inquiry in Peel rejected the attempt of Illinois to
restrict the designation of certification, states may in some instances
regulate the designation of professionals as specialists.14 9
The Court considered similar deceptive and misleading speech is-
sues in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regu-
lation.5° Sylvia Ibanez, an attorney, was also licensed as a certified
public accountant ("CPA") and a certified financial planner ("CFP").
In advertisements for her law practice, she included these certifica-
tions and was reprimanded by the Florida Board of Accountancy
("Board") for practicing accountancy in an unlicensed firm 151 and us-
ing a designation not recognized by the Board.'52 Therefore, the is-
sues are similar to Peel because the case involved whether a
professional could hold herself out as a specialist to the general public.
In this case, however, Ibanez was reprimanded for truthfully holding
herself out as a licensed accountant when she practicing law, not
accounting.
The Court rejected the arguments of the Board that the affected
speech would confuse the public. "[A]s long as Ibanez holds an active
CPA license from the Board we cannot imagine how consumers can
be misled by her truthful representation to that effect."'1 53 The Board
also argued that the term "certified" in CFP implied a state sanc-
tion.154 The Court did not accept this position, citing Peel, which re-
jected the theory that a designation as a specialist indicated state
sanction.' 55 The Board finally attempted to argue that the speech was
potentially misleading.' 56 The Court noted that the mere use of the
term "potentially'misleading" will not "supplant the . . . burden to
'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.' "15 The Court noted
that the Board could not point to "any harm that is potentially real,
from general'legal advice in newspaper advertisement); R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)
("Practice before: The United States Supreme Court").
148. Peel, 496 U.S. at 107 (quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472). The Court, in speak-
ing of the breadth of the regulation compared to what state actions are minimally
needed to combat the deception, is actually conducting a fourth prong analysis.
149. Id at 110. The Court suggests that requiring a screening process or disclaimer.
would be more palatable. Id. The Court again emphasized that a state may not
"completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading." Id.
150. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
151. The Florida Board of Accountancy dropped this charge prior to the close of
the initial proceedings. Id. at 2087.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2089.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2089-90; see also Peel, 496 U.S. at 106-07. But see infra note 182.
156. Id. at 2090.
157. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993)) (citations
omitted).
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not purelyhypothetical," and rejected the Board's contentions. 158
Therefore' Ibanez's truthful speech was not considered misleading in
this instance.
b. Substantial Governmental Interest
The second prong of the Central Hudson test inquires whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. 159 Commercial speech
regulations will only be upheld if there is a substantial governmental
interest tojustify the regulation. The Court has failed to establish a
clear standard for determining when an interest is substantial for
purposes .of the Central Hudson test.'60 Despite the lack of a clear
standard, a broad range of interests have been recognized as
substantial.16 '
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,62 the Court was faced
with a federal statute that prohibited "the mailing of unsolicited ad-
vertisements for contraceptives.' 1 63 Youngs attempted to send an un-
solicited mass mailing of informational pamphlets through the
mails.' 64 The United States Post Office discovered the plan and in-
formed the company that the proposed mailing would violate a fed-
eral statute. 65 Youngs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.166
There was no allegation that the mailings either concerned an illegal
activity 67 or were misleading. The Court thus turned to the second
prong: whether the. governmental interest was substantial. The gov-
ernment claimed two interests in upholding the statute: (1) the statute
"shield[ed] recipients ... from materials that they [were] likely to find
offensive," and (2) the statute assisted "parents' efforts to control the
manner in which their children bec[ame] informed about sensitive and
important subjects such as birth control.'1 68 The Court rejected the
158. Ibanez holds that for commercial speech to be potentially misleading the harm
or confusion it 'may cause must be "potentially real, not purely hypothetical." Id. at
2090. The case constricts the Court's dicta in Peel that in some instances a state may
restrict the truthful and non-misleading statements regarding designation as a special-
ist when the profession itself is regulated by the state. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 110.
159. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
160. See Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
161. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1799 (1993) (consumer protection);
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993) (municipal
interest in safety and aesthetics of streets); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568 (energy
conservation).
162. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
163. l at 61.
164. Id. at 62-63.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The illegality of sending the pamphlets should not have been the focus.
Rather, the first prong focuses on whether the underlying commercial transaction or
activity is illegal. See supra note 131.
168. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71. The Court noted that the government did not have to
rely on the original justification in promulgating the statute during the last century.
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first interest: "[W]e [have] stated that offensiveness was 'classically
not [a justification] validating the suppression of expression protected
by the First Amendment.... [W]e have consistently held that the fact
that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its
suppression.'
'1 69
The Court found the second interest in aiding parents' control over
their children's access to information regarding birth control to be
substantial. 170 The Court did not spend time elaborating onthis find-
ing, but the point seems clear enough.17 Despite the Court's finding
that the interest was substantial, the Court held that the statute failed
the third and fourth prongs. The Court found that the statute pro-
vided only "limited incremental support for the interest asserted.' '1 72
Parents exercise substantial control over mail, and already cope with
various external influences upon their children's beliefs. 73 The Court
also found that the statute was far too broad in its scope."7 4
'In Edenfield v. Fane,75 the Court held that the state must supply
* the "precise interests" they seek to advance, 176 and scrutinize those
asserted "if it appears that the stated interests are not the actual inter-
ests served by the restriction.' ' 77
c. Governmental Interest Directly Advanced
The third prong of the Central Hudson test examines whether the
regulation at issue directly advances the governmental interest as-
Id. at 70. "[T]he insufficiency of the original motivation does not diminish other inter-
ests that the restriction may now serve." Id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460).
169. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 n.23 (1977)).
There is no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech which justifies
such differential treatment. Id. (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 701 n.28).
170. Id at 73.
171. " [Parents] have an important 'guiding role' to play in the upbringing of their
children... which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions."
Id. (quoting H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981)) (citations omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. "Under these circumstances, a ban on unsolicited advertisements serves
only to assist those parents who desire to keep their children, from confronting such
mailings, who are otherwise Unable to do so, and whose children have remained rela-
tively free from such [external] stimuli." Id.
174. Id. "This marginal degree of protection is achieved by purging all mailboxes
of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults." Id.
175. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993). See generally John C. Coots, A Missed Opportunity to
Definitively Apply the Central Hudson Test: Fane v. Edenfield, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1155 (1993) (criticizing the. Eleventh Circuit's application of the Central Hudson test
in Edenfield); Evan R. Levy, Note, Edenfield v. Fane: In-person Solicitation by Profes-
sionals Revisited-What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 261 (1994) (argu-
ing that Supreme Court's treatment of commercial speech in Edenfield is very close to
full Frst Amendment protection).
176. Edenfield, i13 S. Ct. at 1798 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)).
177. Id
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serted in the second prong. 78  This prong requires an "immediate
connection" between the governmental interest and the restriction.179
The Court recently emphasized the burden imposed upon the state:
"the 'free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify
imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truth-
ful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless
from the, harmful.' "180
In Edenfield,18' the Court heard a Florida case challenging a state
ban on in-person solicitations by certified public accountants. 8 2 This
restriction, like the restriction found in Ibanez, was promulgated by
the Florida Board of Accountancy, which defended the prohibition as
"necessary to preserve the independence of CPAs."'1 83
The controversy arose because the statute prevented the plaintiff
from placing unsolicited telephone calls to business executives in or-
der to attract business. The Board asserted that an accountant would
be "beholden" to a client he had solicited, and that an accountant who
solicits business is in need of clients and will therefore be more likely
to break or bend the accountancy rules." 4
Since the commercial speech doctrine is "linked inextricably" with
the underlying commercial arrangement,18 5 if the state has an interest
in regulating the underlying transaction the state may also gain a con-
178. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
179. See id. at 569 ("[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only inef-
fective or remote support for the government's purpose."). See also Edenfield, 113 S.
Ct. at 1800 (" '[Tihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech car-
ries the burden of justifying it.' . .. This burden is not satisfied-by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body ... must demonstrate that the harms it re-
cites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."
(citations omitted)).
180. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646). K
181. 113 S. Ci. 1792 (1993).
182. Id. The Court previously examined a similar issue in the context of a lawyer's
solicitation of clients. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1796 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978), and In re Pnimus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978)); see also supra note 133. The Court in Ohralik held that lawyers
could be banned from in-person solicitations in at least some instances; however, not
all personal solicitation is without First Amendment protection. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
449. But see Edenfield, at 1804 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor would
hold that the states may prohibit commercial speech that "is inconsistent with the
speaker's membership in a learned profession and therefore damaging to the profes-
sion and society at large." Id. See also Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 119
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 488-
91 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 676-77 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing Affidavit of Louis Dooner, a former
chairmen of the Florida Board of Accountancy).
184. Id.
185. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917
(1979).
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comitant interest in the expression itself.'8 6 The Board put forth two
interests in upholding the ban: to protect consumers from fraud and to
maintain the independence of individual CPAs and accounting
firms. 187 The Court held that both interests were substantial.'88
Despite the substantial nature of the state's interests, the blanket
ban failed to "directly advance the state interest involved; the regula-
tion may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote sup-
port for the government's purpose."'189 The Court found that the
Board could provide no support for the contention that the ban ad-
vanced its interests in any direct and material way.' 90 The Court again
stressed the burden upon the state to prove that a restriction should
be upheld.191 "[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
.. must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."' 92
Despite the heavy burden placed on the states by the Edenfield and
Ibanez decisions, the Court appeared to retreat from its tough starice
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Company.193
186. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
187. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at'1799. The Court noted that the state's interest encom-
passed both the prevention of fraud and the protection of privacy. Id. at 1799. As to
fraud, the Court has consistently held that "[the First Amendment... does not pro-
hibit the state from ensuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly
as well as freely." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). The state may completely ban without further. justifica-
tion commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at
1799. What is not allowed is a blanket ban that will envelop truthful and non-mislead-
ing expression along with the fraudulent and deceptive, unless the state can demon-
strate that the restriction reasonably accomplishes a substantial state interest. Id. The
state's second justification relates to the audit and attest services that an accountant
provides. "In the course of rendering these professional services, a CPA reviews fi-
nancial statements and attests that they.., present a fair and accurate picture of the
firm's financial condition." Id. at 1799 (citation omitted).
188. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
189. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
190. The Court found the affidavit by Mr. Dooner to contain only conclusory state-
ments with no basis in fact, and determined that the accounting profession's literature
had come to the exact opposite conclusion as the Board. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1801.
The Court also rejected the Board's 'contention that the regulation was a reasonable
time, place, or manner restriction. Id. at 1801-02. See infra-note 229.
191. Edenfield, at 1800; see supra note 179 and accompanying text.
192. Edenfield, at 1800.
193. 113 S. Ct.' 2696 (1993) (5-4 decision). See generally Tara L. Lavery, Note,
Commercial Speech Suffers a First Amendment Blow in United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 549 (1994) (Edge represents a set-back for First
Amendment protection of commercial speech); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Lead-
ing Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 27, 224 (1993) (overview of commercial speech cases
decided that term). The Court has recently granted certiorari in Adolph Coors Co. v.
Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2671 (1994), aff'd sub
nom. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1995 WL 227629 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1995).
Coors Brewing Company challenged federal requirements which ban statements of
alcohol content on malt beverage labels. Coors claims that such a restriction impli-
cates their commercial speech rights under the First Amendment. The federal govern-
ment claims that such labeling restrictions are necessary to prevent manufacturers
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Edge'owned and operated a radio station in Elizabeth City, North
Carolina, 94 which wanted to accept advertising from the Virginia
state lottery. North Carolina, however, prohibits lotteries.'95 In addi-
tion, federal law prohibits radio stations from advertising lotteries un-
less the broadcast occurs in a state that does not prohibit lotteries.'96
The radio station claimed that the federal law impermissibly burdened
its commercial speech rights by prohibiting all lottery
advertisements. 97
Since the Court easily dispensed with the first Central Hudson
prong, the Court's discussion analyzed the second prong that requires
the state to have a substantial interest in promulgating the regulation.
The Court found that the "congressional policy of balancing the inter-
ests of lottery and non-lottery states" was a substantial governmental
interest. 98 The Court explained how Congress could permissibly
have banned the activity altogether since gambling is considered a
"vice" activity. 199 Thus, the Court found that the government's inter-
est was substantial.200
from entering into "strength wars" over alcoholic content with each other. See gener-
ally Denise D. Trumler, Note, Perpetuating Confusion in the Commercial Speech Area:
Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1193 (1993).
As this Note was going to publicition, the Court handed down its decision in Coors.
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1995 WL 227629 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1995); see
also Justices Allow Unsigned Political Fliers, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1995, at A20. The
Court unanimously upheld the Tenth Circuit and overturned the federal statute. The
Court noted that the government could not point to any relationship between the
government's ban and the prevention of strength wars. Coors, 1995 WL 227629 at *3.
The Court noted both the "general thrust of federal alcohol policy [that] favor[s]
greater disclosure" and the "overall irrationality of the Government's regulatory
scheme," and held that both of these inconsistencies failed to advance the governmen-
tal interest under the third Central Hudson prong. Id. at *5-*7. The Court criticized
the government for relying on anecdotal evidence to extend irrational and conflicting
policies. Id. at *8. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion that questioned the
commercial speech doctrine's application since there was no misleading speech. Id. at
*10. Justice Stevens would have extended'full First Amendment protection to the
speech in this instance. Id.
194. The radio station was operated from Moyock, North Carolina, which is ap-
proximately three miles from the Virginia-North Carolina border. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at
2702. Over 90% of the station's listeners, however, are Virginians, and 95% of the
station's advertising revenue come from Virginia sources. Id.
195. Id. at 2701-02 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289, 14-291 (1986 & Supp. 1992)).
196. See Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2701; Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (1988). The lower
courts held that the statutes failed to directly advance the governmental interest sup-
porting the statutes and were thus unconstitutional. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2702-03. The
Court rejected the court of appeals' finding that because the listening residents of
North Carolina were "inundated with Virginia's lottery advertisements," the prohibi-
tion "is ineffective in shielding North Carolina residents from lottery information."
Id. at 2704.
197. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
198. Id
199. Id. at 2703.
200. Id.
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The third prong, measuring whether the restriction directly ad-
vances the government's interest, was also met in this case. The Court
found that the statute had to be analyzed as a general application to
all radio broadcasters. °a In analyzing the third prong, the Court
found that the statute directly advanced the governmental interest.
The Court explained how the state's interest was directly advanced
because Congress could have permissibly taken even greater steps to
restrict the activity2 12 This is in contrast to the test, followed in Cen-
tral Hudson and Edenfield, namely that "the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the gov-
ernment's purpose. '20 3 However, while one may argue that the stat-
ute provides direct support for the governmental interest, 04, this was
not the standard that the Court applied. The standard that the Court
applied resembled the fourth Central Hudson prong, which requires
that the regulation may not be broader than necessary.0 5 The Court
did, however, find that the governmental, interest was directly ad-
vanced by the statute.
The Court's analysis on the third prong in Edge was substantially
weaker than in Ibanez. "We have no doubt that the statutes directly
advanced the governmental interest at stake in this case. '2 6 The diffi-
culty in reconciling Edenfield and Ibanez with Edge reflects both a
schism among the Justices in their treatment of commercial speech
and the factual settings of the cases. The Court treated the regulation
of "vice" activities more leniently than other types of commercial
speech. 20
Under Central Hudson's fourth prong, the Edge Court examined
the "fit" between the governmental interest behind the regulation and
the restriction imposed. The Court held that the policy limiting lot-
tery broadcasts prevented lottery states and non-lottery states from
impinging on the policies of their neighbors.2 °8 This was considered a
201. Id. at 2104. The Court ruled that the statute's application towards Edge specif-
ically is measured under the fourth prong. Id.
202. Id.
203. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800
(1993).
204. Since the statute did not prevent exposure to lottery advertisements from
outside lottery states, it is questionable whether the statute provided anything more
than remote or ineffective support for the government's arguments. See Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 564. But see Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
205. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Edge Court arrived at this test by
applying the "fit" test announced in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989). This test properly belongs in the fourth prong analysis. Id.
206. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704; cf. id. at 2705 ("We have no doubt that the fit in this
case was a reasonable one."). *
207. See, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328, 341.
208. "In other words, applying the restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge directly
advances the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in non-lottery states,
while not interfering with the policy of lottery states like Virginia." Id. at 2705.
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reasonable congressional policy and its goals fit within the policy
means.2" Therefore, the statute was upheld. z 0
d. No More Extensive Than Necessary
Central Hudson described the fourth prong as "whether [the regula-
tion] is not more extensive than necessary."2 1 ' However, the Court
altered this rule in Board of Trustees of 'the State of New York v.
Fox.212
Fox involved a statute prohibiting private commercial enterprises
from conducting business on State University of New York property,
including residential dormitories.21 3 The District Court found that the
"restrictions on speech were reasonable in light of the dormitories'
[residential] purpose. 21 4 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a regulation is " 'not more extensive than necessary' only if it is
the 'least-restrictive-measure' that could effectively protect the state's
interests. '21 5 The circuit courts split over the interpretation of this
phrase, noting that either an intermediate or strict scrutiny standard
could be required. 16 The Supreme Court held that although commer-
cial speech is important enough to justify distinguishing "the harmless
from the harmful,2 1 7 the fit between the state's interest and its chosen
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2708.
211.- Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
212. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
213. The conflict arose when the University applied the regulation against "Tup-
perware parties" in dormitories. A "Tupperware party" consists of an in-home prod-
uct demonstration where acquaintances are invited into a person's home, and where
the host or hostess receives a benefit or award for holding the event. See id. at 472.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 476. The Court noted that if the term "necessary" is given strict inter-
pretation, then the "least-restrictive-means" test would have been correctly applied
by the court of appeals. Id. The Supreme Court had previously assumed a "least-
restrictive-means" test. Id. However, the term "necessary" has sometimes been in-
terpreted more loosely, and the Court noted that previous commercial speech cases
supported a "flexible meaning for the Central Hudson test." Id. at 476-77. The Court
explained that the confusion arose because none of the previous cases involved regu-
lations that only marginally exceeded the state's interest. Id. at 479 (quoting Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989)).
.216. Several courts interpreted "not more extensive than necessary" to mean "least
restrictive means." Compare Fox V. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying "least-restrictive-means" test) and American Fu-
ture Sys., Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 865 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de.
nied sub nom., Johnson v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 473' U.S. 911 (1985) ("[W]e
believe that this last prong of the Central Hudson test cannot be read as a 'least
restrictive means' requirement."). The Court rejected this approach in favor of an
intermediate test (i.e., " 'narrowly tailored' to serve a significant governmental inter-
est"). Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-78.
217. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 478; see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d
914, 931-35 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Independence Blue Cross v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 498 U.S. 816 (1990) (discussing the lesser constitutional protection
accorded to commercial speech generally).
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means does not have to be flawless. 18 The Court explicitly rejected
the notion that the "least-restrictive-means" standard was the correct
standard for the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.219 Thus, the
Court adopted an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny and signifi-
cantly expanded the power of government to regulate commercial
speech. The adoption of the intermediate test indicated that they
should not second-guess state legislatures, and that courts could allow
restrictions on commercial speech if the state could show a positive
advancement of its interest.2
The intermediate standard announced in Fox does lower the scru-
tiny under which the fourth prong is to be analyzed. The effects of
this shift, however, is mitigated by the Court's traditional preference
for more speech rather than less.22 ' Although this presumption can be
overcome, the Court prefers additional speech.
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,2 the Court ex-
panded upon the "fit" test announced in Fox. The City of Cincinnati.
218. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 ("What our decisions require is ... a fit that is not neces-
sarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposi-
tion but one whose scope is 'in proportion. to. the interest served.' " (citations
omitted)).
219. Id. But see Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas
and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1931 (1992) (asserting that the modified Central Hudson test is merely a rational basis
test).' Commentators have noted a decline in the protection afforded commercial
speech beginning with Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328 (1986), with Fox representing a serious blow to the stature of First
Amendment-protection for commercial speech. See Mauro, at 1951-54 (analyzing
"Supreme Court's Drift"); Douglas Kmiec, Of Newsracks and the First Amendment:
The Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, Oct. 30, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, SCT-Preview file. But see Floyd Abrams, A Growing Marketplace of
Ideas, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at S28-29 (arguing that recent Supreme Court
commercial speech jurisprudence encompasses both significant First Amendment ac-
complishments and setbacks).
220. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81.
221. E.g., Peel, 496 U.S. at 108 ("principle that disclosure of truthful, relevant infor-
mation is more likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making than is con-
cealment of such information"); Bates v. State Bar, 4.33 U.S. 350, 374 (1977) ("[I]t
seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incom-
plete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed deci-
sion."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful,
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than close them.").
222. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). See generally Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Note, City of Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: Towards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Com-
mercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225'(1994) (arguing that the Discovery decision
was a reevaluation of the Court's treatment of commercial speech); Survey & Essay,
City's Selective and Categorical Ban on the Distribution of "Commercial Handbills" is
Violative of the First Amendment, 3 SETON. HALL CONST. L.J. 651 (1993) (noting in-
creased protection of commercial speech after Discovery); Scott S. Servilla, Note,
First Amendment Prohibits Laws That Favor Newsracks Containing Noncommercial
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passed an ordinance aimed at improving the safety and aesthetic ap-
pearance of its streets and sidewalks by prohibiting commercial hand-
bill dispensers.22 3 Cincinnati's primary argument was that "a
categorical prohibition on the use of newsracks [that] disseminate
commercial messages did not burden any more speech than necessary
to further its interest in limiting the number of newsracks [on city
streets]." 224
There was no allegation that the affected speech was deceptive or
concerned illegal activity, and there was no challenge to the substanti-
ality of the government's interest. in the safety and aesthetic appear-
ance of city streets.225 Therefore, the Court tested whether the statute
established a fit between the governmental interest and the means of
achieving that interest. 226
The majority opinion rejected a bright-line rule that would "cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category,' 227 and instead reached a
narrow holding that the city did not establish the required " 'fit' be-
tween its goals and [the] chosen means. '228 The Court further held
that the city's "bare assertion that the 'low value' of commercial
speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and categorical ban,"
Publications Over Dispensing Devices Containing Commercial Publications, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1089 (1993) (arguing that Discovery presages full First Amendment
protection for commercial speech).
223. The regulation prohibited the dispensing of a "commercial handbill" that "(a)
... advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing; or [ 1(b) which
directs attention to any business... for the purpose of directly promoting thereof by
sales; or [ ](c) which... advertises any meeting, theatrical performance, exhibition or
event.., for which an admission ... fee is charged .... " Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1508
(citing CINCINNATI, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 714-1-C (1992)). Admittedly, the defi-
nition of commercial handbill embraces traditional "newspapers," although separate
provisions authorize the public distribution of newspapers. Id. at 1511. But see Gold
Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding
restrictions on all newsracks as valid time, place, or manner restriction).
224. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511. The Court accepted the City's proposition that
decreasing the number of newsracks would be an aesthetic improvement, but rejected
the notion that the discrimination in and of itself was a reasonable fit between the
stated means and ends. Id The Court criticized the City's reliance on the distinction
between commercial'and noncommercial speech. ld. If the Court were to accept the
City's argument that since the speech was commercial in nature and that it could
therefore be regulated, commercial speech would lose all constitutional protection
and the Central Hudson test would be devoid of its value. Id.
225. Id. at 1509-10.
226. Id. at 1510.
227. Id. at 1511. However, some commentators have questioned whether the dis-
tinction between commercial speech and other constitutionally protected speech is
fully supported by constitutional analysis. See Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 651 (1990). The Court sidestepped the
issue in Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-14.
228. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1516. The lower courts did find the effects of the'
statute "paltry" and "minute." Id. at 1510. The Court agreed with this evaluation. Id.
Therefore, the Court implicitly applied the test's third prong of a direct advancement
of the regulation's goals, and found that the city's restriction did not advance the city's
goals except in the most minimal manner.
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failed to establish the requisite fit.22 9 Thus, the distinction between
commercial speech and fully protected speech cannot itself justify all
regulatory control.
Interpreting the Central Hudson test, the Supreme Court has essen-
tially expanded its inherent flexibility. The intermediate level stan-
dard, lesser deference 'to "vice" activities, and fact-based decisions
have injected flexibility into a test that covers the breadth of the com-
mercial speech doctrine. Unfortunately, this flexibility has "left both
sides of the debate with their own well, of precedent from which to
draw,' 2 3° a situation that can cause great confusion.
C. Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren
In National Advertisers,23' the plaintiff filed suit to enjoin enforce-
ment of section 17508.5 of the California Business and Professional
Code, claiming that it impinged on their commercial speech rights.232
When the district court handed down its judgment in 1992, the four
most recent Supreme Court commercial speech cases had not yet been
decided.233 Since these cases were instrumental in refining the Central
Hudson test,, the district court could not rely on the clarification the
Supreme Court has since provided.
1. Decision of the District Court of the Northern District
of California
The Association initially contended that the Statute brought within
its purview not only commercial speech, but noncommercial speech as
well.2 34 Plaintiffs claimed that "they are unable to express their policy
views or publish editorial or informational advertisements aimed at
inducing public activism." '23 The district court decided that the inclu-
229. Id. Compare National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1169
(4th Cir. 1991) (upholding official's discretion in deciding if speech is commercial or
non-commercial), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992) With National Advertising Co. v.
Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that content discrimi-
nation of signs acts as an impermissibte commercial versus non-commercial distinc-
tion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 852 (1990). The Court also analyzed the statute under the
time, place, and manner doctrine, which posits that restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of the speech are allowable if they do not impinge on the content of the
speech. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S.
937 (1989); see also Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1344. For an exhaustive discussion of the
doctrine, see TRIBE, supra note 98, at 941 n.83, 977-86; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra.
note 98, § 16.47, at 1087-88.
230. Abrams, supra note 219, at S28.
231. 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g
denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995).
232. See supra note 26.
233. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993); Edenfield v.
Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); Discovery, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
234. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 751-54.
235. Id. at 751.
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sion of protected speech will not render commercial speech fully
protected.236
The district court classified the speech at issue as commercial
speech.2-7 The court relied on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.,238 where the Supreme Court classified the speech at issue as
commercial because it: (1) took the form of advertisements; (2) re-
ferred to a specific product; and (3) contained the presence of an eco-
nomic motive.239 While the presence of any of these factors is not
dispositive, the presence of all of them strongly supports the conclu-
sion that the speech is commercial in nature.240 As in Bolger, the dis-
trict court found all three characteristics in the proposed speech, and
thus concluded that the speech was commercial.241
The district court held that the environmental marketing claims af-
fected by the Statute are at least potentially misleading under the first
prong of Central Hudson.242 By characterizing the claims in this man-
ner, the court acknowledged that they may have value in certain con-
texts.243 From both logical and environmental perspectives, speech
that is potentially confusing in some contexts will be perfectly clear in
236. Id. at 752-53.
237. Id. at 754. In most instances, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 will reach
only commercial speech. However, it would not be difficult to imagine a manufac-
turer creating a public service-oriented advertisement that, by way of example, illus-
trates the manufacturer's record. The plaintiffs proyided several examples to the
district court. Id. at 752 n.6. In -Fox, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere
inclusion of non-commercial speech elements does not convert commercial speech
into fully protected speech any more than "opening sales presentations with a prayer
or a Pledge of Allegiance would convert them into religious or political speech."
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989). But see Riley v. National Fed'n of
Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that commercial speech is inextricably inter-
twined with noncommercial speech during solicitations for charitable organizations).
The district court likewise rejected the argument that commercial advertisements and
policy statements were inseparable. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 752.
238. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
239. Id. at 66-67.
240. Id. at 67.
241. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 754.
242. Id. at 755. If the statements are inherently deceptive, the speech will not enjoy
any First Amendment protection. If the statements are potentially misleading, the
Central Hudson analysis will continue. Compare In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203
(1982) (holding that "states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information... if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive") with Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 24 F.3d 754 (5th Cit. 1994) (holding that statements are misleading when
inherently likely to deceive).
243.-Not all claims will be misleading in all instances, for example, some recycling
claims may not be true in one region but true in another. Depending on the availabil-
ity or proximity of facilities, the lack of information may hinder the very environmen-
tal activity which the statute is attempting to promote. But see National Advertisers,
44 F.3d at 731.
I
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others.2' " Under the Central Hudson analysis, this potentially decep-
tive speech may be regulated but not banned entirely.245
Since the parties agreed that California had a substantial consumer
protection interest in the Statute, the court dispensed with analysis of
the second prong.246 The court proceeded to the third prong, which
requires the regulation to directly advance the state's interest.247
-The court found that California's consumer protection interest was
advanced by the Statute.248 The court reasoned that since consumers
have "difficulty determining the veracity of the environmental claims
advertisers make concerning [products]" the state's requirement of
standard definitions will ensure that all marketers are on a level play-
ing field.2 49 The court held that the Statute would "decrease[] the
chance that consumers will be misled by the use of undefined environ-
mental terms," and found reasonable the legislature's belief that "uni-
form standards for frequently used environmental advertising terms
would promote the state's consumer protection goals .... ,,250 There-
fore, the court held that the Statute directly advanced the state's
interest.251
Under the fourth Central Hudson prong, the regulation must rea-
sonably fit the governmental interest.252 Preliminarily, the court
noted that the Statute prohibited the use of various terms when they
do not meet the established definition, even where clarifying language
is added.253 Next, the court pointed out that the commercial speech
doctrine does not protect all factually accurate claims.
254
244. If a product is recyclable in San Diego County, but is not recyclable in every
county with a population over 300,000, the product representation is still perfectly
clear to those persons in San Diego County. Nor would such a representation hinder
recycling efforts because such a claim would advance recycling efforts in the locality in
the product is sold in.
245. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. In striking down all confusing
speech, helpful speech is also banned. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
246. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 756. The district court did not find that.
the state had an environmental interest in the promulgation of the statute. However,
the fact that the state did indeed have such an interest is undeniable. This fact was
recognized, although without discussion, in the circuit court's opinion. National Ad-
vertisers, 44 F.3d at 732-33.
247. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The district court drew a parallel between
the case at bar and Central Hudson because "there is an immediate connection in this
case between environmental advertising and sales." National Advertisers, 809 F.
Supp. at 756-57.
248. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 757.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-80.
253. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 758. The California Attorney General
urged the court to construe the statute narrowly, i.e., only when qualifying language is
absent. Id. at 758 n.12. The court did not reach the issue. Id.
254. Id. at 758.
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The court held that since the state has an interest in "encouraging
recycling and reducing solid waste, ' 255 it was reasonable to restrict
products designated as recyclable only if every county with a popula-
tion of 300,000 or more could conveniently recycle that product.256
The court rejected the argument that allowances for clarifying lan-
guage would remove this obstacle because some claims might still be
misleading.25 7 The court analyzed the term "biodegradability" in a
similar manner, and was thus unconvinced that less restrictive means
of accomplishing the state's goals existed.258 The court also rejected
the argument that the state could merely have enforced the general
deceptive advertising laws more aggressively to crack down on mis-
leading environmental marketing.259
The court then turned to the Association's challenge that the Stat-
ute was impermissibly vague.26° The district court found definition of
"recyclable" impermisibly vague and severed the definition from the
Statute.26'
Since the Statute satisfied the Central Hudson test, the court upheld
its validity, with the exception of the definitionof "recyclable." The
Association then appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
2. The Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
While the Association appealed the district court's ruling on the
commercial speech issue to the Ninth Circuit, California elected not to
appeal the district court's severance of the term "recyclability."
The Ninth Circuit preliminarily upheld the district court's ruling
that the speech at issue was commercial, and therefore an intermedi-
ate level of judicial scrutiny applied under Central Hudson.262 The
Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's ruling that the commer-
cial and non-commercial speech were not inextricably intertwined,
which would have raised the level of judicial scrutiny.263 The analysis
then turned to the Central Hudson test.
In response to the first prong, the Ninth Circuit set out, but did not
apply, four factors which determine whether commercial speech en-
joys First Amendment protection: (1) "whether the speech restricted
is devoid of intrinsic meaning;" (2) the "possibilities for deception;"
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989)).
259. Id. at 758 ("[Njothing prevents a legislative body from adopting a specific law
simply because a more general law already exists.")
260. Id. at 759-62. Discussion of the vagueness claim is beyond the scope of this
Note.
261. Id. at 762.
262. NationalAdvertisers, 44 F.3d at 728.
263. Id. at 730.
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(3) "whether experience has proved that in fact such advertising is
subject to abuse;' and (4) the "ability of the intended audience to
evaluate the claims made."264 The Ninth Circuit determined that
whether the statements are misleading depends upon what type of re-
cycling facilities are available in the area.Z6 5 Therefore, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's ruling that some environmental
marketing claims are "potentially misleading" since some items may
not actually be recyclable in a given area. 66 Since California's inter-
ests in environmental and consumer protection were undisputed, the
Ninth Circuit moved on to the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
The Ninth Circuit found that California's interest was directly pro-
moted by the statute.267 The majority opinion held that, "California
seeks to guard against a direct, predictable and ongoing result of
green marketing-increased sales of goods as a result of potentially
specious claims or ecological puffery about products with minimal en-
vironmental attributes. 268
Both the consumer and environmental protection interests were ad-
vanced by the Statute. The Ninth Circuit took these in turn. "Section
17508.5 increases certainty in the market both on the demand side and
the supply side. , The statute increases consumer knowledge and
awareness and discourages exploitation and deception....269 The
Ninth Circuit was confident that the Statute would provide the moni-
toring functions a consumer cannot adequately perform. 270 The court
held that while performing these functions, the Statute did not operate
in the paternalistic manner condemned by the Court in Peel.271 The
majority also believed that section 17508.5 would benefit scrupulous
manufacturers by rewarding those that met the minimum standards
272
and suggested that firms may also benefit from lower insurance premi-
ums and legal costs. 273
264. Id. at 731 (citations omitted).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 732.
268. Id.
269. Id at 733. It is unclear how the statute increases consumer knowledge or
awareness. Since less, or at least no more, information is provided by the statute, it is
difficult to see how consumers will glean additional knowledge or awareness. On the
other hand, one could make the argument that consumers gain confidence in the
claims that are allowable under the statute because they may know the product must
meet a statutory minimum. The court held that "these provisions give all consumers
information permitting them to make rational product comparisons and tradeoffs in
price versus 'greenness.' " Id. This claim is patently false. Nowhere in the statute are
consumers given information except the term itself. And there is no provision for
information in a manner which would allow for easy comparison amongst brands or
explanation of terms.
270. Id. at 734.
.271. 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990).
272. See National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 734.
273. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that California's interest was advanced by
consumers' increased certainty of environmental claims in the mar-
ket.274 The court found that the Statute enabled consumers to avoid
products with minimal environmental attributes, prevented unscrupu-
lous advertising, and gave consumers more information upon which to
base their purchasing decisions.2 75 This ensured the "flow and purity
of [the] information [stream] in the marketplace. 2 76 The court, in an-
alyzing whether California's interest was advanced by the Statute,
seemed to be making an analysis of the type of "mere speculation or
conjecture" that the Supreme Court rejected in Edenfield.2 77
The Ninth Circuit held that California's environmental interest was
met by setting minimum, although modest, targets as an incentive to
reduce the waste stream.278 This "directly furthers, California's sub-
stantial interest in promoting resource conservation and reducing the
burden on its brimming landfills. '279 Therefore, section 17508.5 meets
the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
The Association argued that section 17508.5 violated the fourth
Central Hudson prong by sweeping within its ambit "so far beyond
what could possibly be deemed false and deceptive that it cannot pos-
sibly provide a reasonable fit with the state's interests. 2 80 The plain-
tiffs raised the identical alternatives in the district court hearing.281 As
the court stated, "the thresholds drawn do not appear unduly prohibi-
tive and leave considerable room for both more privileged editorial
274. Id. at 733-34.
-275. Id. at 733.
276. Id.
277. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2088 n.7, 2090-92 (1994).
278. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 735.
279. Id.
280. Id. The plaintiffs attacked the statute for prohibiting the use of the terms even
in the presence of qualifying language. Even though the statute precludes such lan-
guage, the court held that the statute was narrowly tailored. National Advertisers, 809
F. Supp. at 758 n.12. However, the court also conceded that section 17508.5 would
facially prevent a manufacturer from making a claim using the prohibited language
combined with limiting language. Id. See generally Dick Rawe, Recycling Battle Be-
gins Beyond Good Will: Labels Pit States Against Firms, CIN. POST, Jan. 28, 1991, at
7B. The district court gave great weight to the California Legislature's finding that
allowing manufacturers to define the terms themselves "would not promote the
state's consumer and environmental goals." National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 758.
Despite the fact that the statute prohibited. additional statements in advertising that
were entirely correct, the district court held' it to be drawn sufficiently narroW under
Central Hudson and its progeny. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 759. See supra
notes 55-57.
281. The plaintiffs argued that the California Legislature could have chosen to re-
quire disclaimers or qualifying language, but the district court ruled that this would
not further the state's interests. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 759. The plain-
tiffs also argued that California could have been more stringent in enforcing the provi-
sions of the Business and Professional Code relating to deceptive and false
advertising. Id. at, 758-59. The district court noted that nothing prevents a legislature
from enacting a specific law when a general law already exists. Id.
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commentary and... alternative expressions conveying ... information
about the modest environmental attributes of products not measuring
up under [the Statute] (e.g., 'this product contains x% (reused/recap-
tured) materials .... 2
In short, the Ninth Circuit's opinion evaluated section 17508.5 with-
out significant analysis. For instance, discussion and application of the
recent Supreme Court decisions was noticeably absent from the Ninth
Circuit's discussion. The Ninth Circuit's deferential stance towards
section 17508.5 also ignored the recent pronouncements on the appli-
cation of Fox's intermediate review standard: In deciding the case, the
majority did not seem to fully understand, or even discuss, the changes
in the Central Hudson test since Fox. The Ninth Circuit also ignored
less-restrictive alternatives to the California Statute.28 3
Judge Noonan dissented vigorously from the decision. However,
the dissenting opinion, like the majority opinion, skated over the Cen-
tral Hudson test without concrete analysis.2 While conceding that
the Statute concerned commercial speech and that the government
could regulate "untrue or deceptive advertising," Judge Noonan de-
scribed the Statute as "a zealous and unconstitutional intrusion by a
state government into an area where technologies are developing, the
free play of ideas is important, and the free speech of everyone... is
essential to the development of a healthy environment. Tested by our
Bill of Rights, the statute is defective. 2 85
The dissent first attacked the vagueness of the definitions enunci-
ated in section 17508.5, that impose criminal penalties for using the
terms in violation of the Statute.2 86 The dissent argued that the terms
"nature," "unnatural," "biodegradable," and "photodegradable" are
282. National*Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 736:37. However, the terms that are defined
in section 17508.5 are used by marketers because they are the terms with which con-
sumers are more familiar and comfortable. On the other hand, "reused" brings to
mind thrift shops, and "recaptured" has little meaning to the average consumer; "re-
cyclable" is the term that American consumers use to mean something that can be
gathered and used again.: See supra note 15. In addition, the terms provided by the
court are no more inherently clear than the terms in section 17508.5. National Adver-
tisers, 44 F.3d at 736-37.
283. The court of appeals failed to analyze section 17508.5 in terms of the Discov-
ery, Edenfield, or Edge decisions. The district court's opinion did not discuss these
cases because they had 'not been handed down at the time. The court of appeals in.
National Advertisers applied a rational basis review to section 17508.5 despite its dicta
to the contrary. See National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 735-36. The Supreme Court
rejected such an approach in Discovery. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
284. See supra'notes 264 and 283 and accompanying text.
285. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 737 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 738 (Noonan, J., dissenting).. Judge Noonan argued that the terms "na-
ture," "unnatural," "biodegradable," and "photodegradable," as well as the distinc-
tion between "recyclable" and "recycled" are not defined with sufficient clarity by the
Statute. Id.
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inherently confusing.287 The Statute forces the manufacturer "to de-
termine at the peril of criminal. penalties that the product advertised
does not have [these] elusive metaphysical qualit[ies]." 288  ,
The dissent criticized the lack of common sense used in defining the
terms "recycled" and "recyclable." '289 Judge Noonan further argued
that the terms are incomprehensible to manufacturers.29 ° The terms
may be comprehensible to manufacturers, but they are, at best, un-
wieldy for consumers. The definitions potentially could lead to de-
creased consumer knowledge about the products and could dampen
consumer ability to pressure manufacturers to change products
through their purchasing decisions. At the very least, the Statute has
not sufficiently decreased confusion.
Finally, the dissent noted that the term "recycled" was not fully de-
fined within section 17508.5,291 and that the fit between the statutory
goal and the definition itself was unreasonable.. 92 For instance, while
the Statute treats -all recycled materials equally, Judge Noonan noted
that the Environmental Protection Agency has found no basis for such
equal treatment.293 The various products contain different materials,
and these materials have differing recycling requirements and technol-
ogies.294 He wrote, "[a]t best it is a speculation that there is any con-
nection between protection of the environment, encouragement of
environmentally sensitive advertisers, and protection of environmen-
tally conscious consumers and [the Statute]. 295 The dissent also ar-
287. "What is unnatural deterioration of the Ozone?" Id. After positing this rhe-
torical query, Judge Noonan questioned what state of ozone is considered the natural
state. Id.
288. Id The dissent employed the same argument to complain about "biodegrad-
able" and "photodegradable." Id. The statute defines biodegradable as capable of
decomposing through natural biological processes. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17508.5(b). Again the dissent questioned what minimal level of human activity is
allowed or denied in determining if the definition is met, and also applied a similar
argument for the term "photodegradable." National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 738 (Noo-
nan, J., dissenting).
289. "[W]hat is recyclable should eventually be recycled.... The statute, however,
adopts one definition of 'recyclable' and another of 'recycled', so that what is 'recycl-
able' will not necessarily be 'recycled' when re-use is made." Id. But cf. National
Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 759-62 (invalidating term "recyclable" on vagueness
grounds).
290. Id
291. d; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e); see also CAL. Pun. Corr.
CODE § 12200(b). The term "recycled" is defined by cross-reference to PUB. CONT.
CODE § 12200(b). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e).
292. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 740 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See supra note
191 and accompanying discussion.
293. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 738; see EPA Request for Comments[:] Gui-
dance for Use of the Term 'Recycled' and 'Recyclable' and the Recycling Emblem in
Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992, 49,996 (1991).
294. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 738 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
295. Id.
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gued that the Statute involved impermissible restrictions on
viewpoint.296
Judge Noonan criticized the district court for finding the Statute's
definitions to be "potentially misleading" and thus within the purview
of the Central Hudson test.297 The dissent criticized the paucity of
evidence supporting this point, much of which was compiled from ar-
guments made by parties who assisted in passing the legislation.298
The dissent emphasized that even if this finding were based on facts,
the term potentially misleading could be applied to many terms used
by advertisers, such as the words "antique," "bargain," "economical,"
"environmentally sound," and "naturally good. '299 The dissent stated:
A paternalistic government might decide to protect consumers by
criminalizing all advertising containing these words if the product
advertised failed to conform with the state's own definition. That
the terms defined were capable of misleading use would be incon-
testable. That a criminal law of this character would violate the
First Amendment would be equally incontestable. Potential misuse
"does not satisfy the State's heavy burden of justifying a categorical
prohibition against the dissemination of accurate factualinformation.,,o
The dissent concluded that the Statute "cannot survive the test of ra-
tionality, let alone strict scrutiny."'30 1
Since the Ninth Circuit'denied plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing, 0 2
the Supreme Court is the Association's only possible remaining hope
for judicial reprieve. However, to this point, no court has seriously
examined the effect on environmentalism that the California green
marketing statute wields.
D. National Advertisers and California's Environmental Goals
The decision in National Advertisers ignores the Statute's actual ef-
fects upon the environment and green advertising. The actual effects
296. This argument was briefed to the court, but the majority opinion did not dis-
cuss it. Id. at 739-40 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at
31 n.13). Discrimination on the basis of an individual viewpoint raises the level of
judicial scrutiny used by 'courts considering the constitutionality of a regulation on
speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
297. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 738-39 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
298. Id. The dissent noted that the letters entered into evidence on this point were
one from the Attorney General's office that merely opined, and another letter from
the sponsor of the Statute that, only managed to cite one example of questionable
environmental advertising. Id. at 739. Contra supra notes 9-12 and accompanying
text. Judge Noonan concluded that the evidence relied upon by the state is the type
of evidence condemned in Edenfield and Ibanez. See supra note 179.
299. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 739.
300. Id. at 739 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 109 (1990)).
301. Id. at740 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
302. National Advertisers, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995) (order denying pe-
tition for rehearing).
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of California's Statute on environmentalism defeat many of the state's
goals and violate the theme of flexibility inherent in the Central Hud-
son test.3° 3 Therefore, the state has not established the fit required
between the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs.
The most egregious problem is the Statute's failure to accommodate
qualifying language, which explains the meaning of the environmental
attributes or recyclability of products.30 4 The conclusion of the Ninth
Circuit ignored the fact that, in many instances, not only will con-
sumer information be curtailed, but by the very terms of the Statute,
the environmental product information will cease. 30 5 The state's in-
terests in consumer protection and environmental standards are not
likely to benefit from a suppression of environmental information.30 6
Ironically, this portion of the decision is potentially the most dam-
aging from an environmental perspective. The district court opinion
gave an example regarding the term "recyclable," which pointed out a
damaging aspect of the Statute.30 7 The Statute defines a re cyclable
product as one which can be "conveniently recycled . . . in every
county in California with a population over 300,000 persons. 308
However, a carton of milk which claims on its label that it "is recycl-
able in San Diego County," would violate the Statute despite its com-
plete accuracy. Unless California has provided convenient recycling
facilities in every county containing 300,000 persons that can handle
this type of milk carton, the residents of San Diego county will be
denied the-necessary recycling information. Therefore, this statutory
construction will be detrimental to, not supportive of, California's in-
terest in reducing the waste stream.30 9 Manufacturers of products that
303. See, e.g., supra note 220 and accompanying text.
304. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977) ("[I]t seems peculiar to denythe consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the
relevant information needed to reach an informed decision.") reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
881 (1977) ; New York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 841 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding "fundamental failure to distinguish between truthful, non-mislead-
ing solicitation and blockbusting" in residential property sales failed to achieve de-
sired fit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 511 (1994); Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997
F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving substitution clauses of non-commercial
messages in outdoor sign regulation); Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1577
(11th Cir. 1992) ("Yet when the First Amendment is 'at issue, the preferred remedy is
more disclosure, rather than less.") (quoting Bates at 375); Project 80s, Inc. v. City of
Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The government's imposition of affirmative
obligations on the residents' First Amendment rights to receive speech is not
permissible.").
305. But see supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
306. The state certainly has an interest in ensuring that the qualifying language is
clear and readable. However, a complete ban violates the third and fourth prongs of
the Central Hudson analysis.
307. National Advertisers, 809 F. Supp. at 758.'
308. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(d).
309. But see GREEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-42; GREEN REPORT II, supra note
22, at 18-27 (stating the belief that banning misleading information is more beneficial
than allowing clarifying language). 11
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can be recycled in some regions cannot encourage recycling if the pop-
ulation is not large enough or if there is no facility that can handle it in
the immediate area. In turn, the decreased supply of recyclable goods
will hurt recycling facilities by denying them materials. Indeed, there
would also-be less of an incentive from a corporate perspective to cre-
ate products with environmentally friendly attributes.
In addition, setting a statutory minimum for recycling will result in a
standard that will remain static, thereby inhibiting environmental pro-
gress. Such minimum standards will remove any incentive for manu-
facturers to improve the positive environmental attributes of their
products. A more flexible regulation would improve the state's ability
to meet its environmental goals and could lead to market competition
over improving environmental attributes. While the choice of a statu-
tory approach does not violate the Central Hudson analysis, California
does have an interest in providing flexible environmental marketing
regulation that can adapt as it evolves.
In analyzing California's interest in environmental protection, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Statute creates an "incentive for manufac-
turers ... to enhance the environmental attributes of their goods in
order to capture the benefits of green labeling. ' 310 Again, this argu-
ment presumes that the manufacturers will not stagnate after reaching
the statutory standards.31' The argument further presumes that pres-
sure from the state is a more effective agent for progress than pressure
from the marketplace. However, if there is a sizable consumer market
to protect, market forces will in turn promote the desired changes. 1 2
So long as advertising is not misleading or deceptive, state interfer-
ence in the marketplace is unnecessary and undesirable.313
The California environmental marketing statute has many undesir-
able effects. Allowances for qualifying language and a functioning
safe-harbor rule would eliminate' many, but not all, of these
problems.314 At the very least, these two steps would remove all
doubt as to whether the Statute is broader than necessary to meet the
state's interests. Other states have enacted statutes designed to com-
bat the same environmental marketing problems and have avoided
some of the pitfalls created by the California Statute.31 5 These states
have taken approaches that might illuminate some of the defects in
California's environmental marketing statute.31 6
310. National Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 735.
311. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
312. See BOLD, ET AL. supra note 87, at 181-99 (discussing the benefits and superi-
ority of market-based solutions).
313. Id.
314. If these allowances were made, a provision could be added to prevent the ad-
ditional language from being confusing or misleading.
315. See infra part III.
316. Id.
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING STATUTES
1. Definitional Statutes
Both before and after the publication of the Green Report,317 sev
eral other states enacted legislation regulating environmental market-
ing claims.318 These statutes vary both in scope and austerity. In
particular, Maine's unique approach to environmental regulation is
separately analyzed with the federal guidelines since they are closely
allied. Of the remaining state statutes, only those enacted by Indiana
and Rhode Island may be classified as definitional in nature. New
York, New Hampshire, and Connecticut have enacted statutes that
promote the use of logos to publicize environmental attributes of
products.
The Indiana environmental marketing statute is substantially simi-
lar to California's, since it was based upon it.3 19 The terms "bi-
odegradable," "ozone friendly," "photodegradable," and "recycled"
as defined in the Indiana statute are substantially the same as those
used by California.32 ° In addition, the Indiana statute defines the
terms "compostable," "consumer goods," and "package. ' 32 1 The only
term that is defined in a substantially different manner is "recycl-
able."322 Indiana's definition eliminates the requirement that the arti-
cle can be "conveniently recycled in every county ... over 300,000
persons." 323
Two substantive differences set the Indiana statute apart from the
California statute. First, the safe-harbor provision allowing qualifying
language in the Indiana statute is broader.324 Whereas California ex-
empts only representations conforming to the FTC rules, the Indiana
statute exempts marketing practices that conform to either rules or
guidelines set by the FTC.32 5
317. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
318. However, most states. still rely on their general deceptive advertising statutes.
Israel, supra note 44, at 320; Rathe, supra note 45, at 434-36.
319. See Rathe, supra note 45, at n.204.
320. Compare IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-17-3, -6, -8-10 (Bums Supp. 1994) with
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5.
321. IND. CODE §§ 24-5-17-4 to 5, 7.
322. IND. CODE §§ 24-5-17-9." "Recyclable" is defined as:
a material or product [that] can be redeemed or returned at an identifiable
recycling location for the purpose of returning the material to the economic
mainstream in the form of raw material for new, reused, or reconstituted
materials which meet quality standards necessary to be used in the
marketplace.
Id.
323. Contra CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(d).
324. IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2(b). "It is a violation... unless that consumer good or
its package meets the definitions contained in this chapter or meets definitions estab-
lished in trade regulations or guides adopted by the Federal Trade Commission or in
enforceable regulations adopted by another federal agency .... " Id.
325. IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2(b). This point is vitally important. The marketers sup-
ported standardized guidelines. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 'However,
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The second divergence from the California statute is that the Indi-
ana statute provides for a private cause of action for anyone who suf-
fers actual damages.326 In most instances, the harm caused by the
representation will be measured only by the price of the product,
which is ordinarily low. However, the potential for class-action litiga-
tion will serve as a powerful deterrent.
Clearly, the most important difference is that the safe harbor en-
compasses not only FTC rules, but also the'recently enacted guide-
lines. This provision eliminates the trade-disrupting aspect of
conflicting state laws from a manufacturer's perspective and reduces
the inflexibility of environmental marketing regulation. 327 Marketers
will confidently be able to place goods claiming environmental attrib-
utes in the Indiana market if they conform to the FTC guidelines. 28
Rhode Island enacted a statute in 1990,329 which sought to regulate
the terms used to advertise "degradable" plastics and packaging.33 °
The statute very simply forbids the use of the terms "degradable,"
"biodegradable,". "photodegradable," or "environmentally safe" on
plastic products or packaging. 331 However, Rhode Island has not en-
acted a law generally regulating environmental marketing.
Rhode Island enacted the statute in response to a specific problem
regarding degradable plastic products. 332 The Rhode Island legisla-
since the FTC has issued only guidelines, and not rules, the California statute effec-
tively has no safe zone. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
326. IND. CODE § 24-5-17-,14(b), states that: "[a] person who suffers actual damages
from a violation of this act may bring an action to rec over the actual damage plus
attorney's fees." Id. The effectiveness of this provision is highly dubious, since the
basic problem with environmental claims is that damages are too difficult for consum-
ers to substantiate.
327. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
328. Id.
329. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.17 (Supp. 1994).
330.' The statute was enacted the year before.-the Attorney General conference.
The Rhode Island Attorney General did not participate in the conference. See supra
note 23; see also Tom Arrandale, Greens Earn Seal of Approval, ROCKY" MTN. NEWS,
Sept. 19, 1991, at 64.
331.\ R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.14-3 (Supp. 1994). The statute defines the following
terms:
"Degradable plastic" shall mean any thermoplastic synthetic polymeric ma-
terial, commonly known as plastic, which has been modified in any way for
the purposes of weakening in the presence of ultraviolet' radiation or
microorganisms.
"Photodegradable plastic" shall mean any thermoplastic synthetic poly-
meric material, commonly known as plastic, into which has been incorpo-
rated light-sensitive chemical additives or copolymers for the purposes of
weakening the bonds of the polymer in the presence of ultraviolet radiation.
"Biodegradable plastic" shall mean any thermoplastic synthetic polymeric
material, commonly known as plastic, into which cornstarch or other addi-
tives have been incorporated into the formulation for the purposes of weak-
ening the material in the presence of micro-organisms.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.14-2.
332. See supra note 11.
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ture determined that the sale of these products was harming the
state's attempts to "extend the life of landfills," and harming the
state's recycling efforts by introducing contaminants into the recycling
stream.333 Therefore, the use of these terms was simply banned.334
This action came at the same time many degradable plastic claims
were exposed as false and misleading.335
2. State Logos
Another approach that several states have implemented is the es-
tablishment of a state "recycling logo. '336 New York, Connecticut,
and New Hampshire are among the states that have followed this
path. This method entails the creation or adoption of a logo to denote
recyclable or environmentally-friendly products. The use of such
logos has often been introduced through consumer education
programs. 33
7
New York was one of the first states to create a recycling logo pro-
gram.338 Like other state statutes, New York's statute defines the
333. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.14-1.
334. Id At first blush, this outright ban would seem to violate the commercial
speech doctrine. However, the state interest extends only to plastics as opposed to all
products. There is doubt that any truthful scientific claim could be made that sup-
ports these statements. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 11.
336. But cf. Mayer, supra note 83 (reporting confusion from private placement of
recycling logos). Several private companies have created logo programs as well.
These businesses independently test products; if the product meets the certification
program's criteria, an emblem is placed upon the product. There are currently at least
two such certification programs in the United States Green Cross and Green Seal.
Grant Ferrier, Two Groups Seek to Keep the Record Straight, BALT. EVENING SUN,
Oct. 9, 1990, at El; Picking Environmentally Safe Products Just Became More Confus-
ing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 1991, .at C1. The two programs employ different
methods to judge products. Green Cross certifies products that meet a higher static
standard, whereas Green Seal certifies products that harm the environment less than
other products in the product category. Doug Fruehling, Products To Get Green
Light, PiTr. PRESS, July 6, 1990, at C8. Similar programs, albeit under government
sponsorship, have been employed in Germany, Canada, and Japan. Daniel P. Jones,
Green Seal's Label Plan Gets Down to Earth, SUN SENTINEL, June 23, 1990" at 7D;
Andrew Maykuth, New Label to Tag 'Environmentally Friendly' Products, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, June 15, 1990; see also ANA Endorses International Environmental Claims
Code, supra note 55. But see Casey Bukro, Watchdogs Seeing Red Over 'Green' La-
beling, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1991, at 1 (environmental watchdogs criticize environmen-
tal labels); Jamie Beckett, Behind the Zeal for Seals as the Marketing Appeal of Seals
of Approval Rises, There Is Confusion Over What They Mean, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6,
1990, at Cl (consumers confused over what private labels endorse). See generally
GREEN REPORT II, supra note 22, at 13-17; Downs, supra note 1, at 172-74; Grodsky,
supra note 48, at 192-203, 208-18; Howett, supra note 45, at 448-55; Israel, supra note
44, at 321-23; Do Seals Sell? The Market Impact of Product Certification, GREEN
MARKETALERT, Feb. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW, GRMKTAL File (page un-
available online).
337. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0401(2)(a) (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1995).
338. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0401.
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terms "recycled" and "recyclable" for the purposes of the logo pro-
gram.339 The statute sets forth the "international chasing arrows sym-
bol" as the official state recycling logo. 34 ° Directly beneath the
symbol, words denoting the terms "recycled," "recyclable," or "re-
used" are placed on a product's packaging.3 1
The New York statute defines standards for products that volunta-
rily elect to carry the logo. The "recycled" symbol sets standards for
various materials that the products must contain to qualify for the
logo. 42 The "recyclable" symbol will be granted only to products or
packages that "can be used in [their] entirety., as a feedstock at the
beginning of [the] manufacturing process. 343
Connecticut was also an early leader in state-sponsored logos de-
noting recycled and recyclable material. As early as 1988, Connecticut
created a state logo and delegated responsibility for the implementa-
tion of the environmental logo plan. 34 The law itself required the
339. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 368.2 (1990) provides the following
definitions of recycled and recyclable:
(k) Recyclable means a material for which any of the following standards
are met:
(1) access to community recyclable recovery programs for that mate-
rial is available to no less than 75 percent of the population of the state;
or
(2) a statewide recycling rate of 50 percent has been achieved within
the material category; or(3) a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer achieves a statewide re-
cycling rate of 50 percent for the product or package sold within the state;
or
(4) a product or package may be recyclable within the jurisdiction of a
municipality where an ongoing source separation and recycling program
provides the opportunity for recycling of the product or package.
(1) Recycled means a package or product containing a specified minimum
percentage by weight of secondary material content and minimum percent-
age by weight of post-consumer material as described in subdivision 368.4(a)
of this Part. The percentage of secondary material content shall be that por-
tion of a package or product weight that is composed of secondary material
as demonstrated by an annual mass balance of all feedstocks and outputs of
the manufacturing process. The weight of secondary material use in any
month shall be no less than 80 percent of the average secondary. material
usage during the corresponding calendar year.
340. See id. § 368.4. For a history of this familiar symbol see Recycling Symbol is
Recycled From Contest Entry, STAR TRIB., Jan. 18, 1994, at 7E, available in
WESTLAW, Papers File.
341. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 368.4. The logo also notes that it is a
trademark of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Id.
342. Id. § 368.4(a); see also. Cailin Brown, The Truth Behind 'Green' Products,
TIMES UNION, Apr. 21, 1991, at D1, available in WESTLAW, Papers File; Phil Brown,
Recyclable Products to Get State Labels Next Year, TIMES UNION, Sept. 29, 1990, at
B5, available in WESTLAW, Papers File.
343. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 368.4(b).
344. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-255c (1994). The statute in pertinent part
provides:
The commissioner of environmental protection shall... adopt (1) official
symbols that may be placed on packages indicating recyclability or recycled
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state Commissioner of Environmental Protection to create an official
state recycling logo and to promulgate procedures for its use.345
Similarly, in 1989, the New Hampshire legislature adopted the "in-
ternational 3 arrow recycling emblem," coupled with a designation
that the product is either recycled or recyclable, as the official logo. 46
The statute enacting the use of environmental logos grants authority
to the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services to de-
fine which materials are "recyclable material" 34 7 and to adopt stan-
dards for the qualifications of various products. 348 The statute defines
"recycled material" as containing "at least 50 percent post-consumer
material." 349 The use of the logo in contravention of the Department
of Environmental Services rules constitutes a per se unfair and decep-
tive trade practice. 5 .
The logo system adopted by these various states has many advan-
tages over regulatory schemes like California's. Logo statutes allow
greater flexibility in the administration of the program and do not re-
material content and (2) procedures for the use of such symbols .... Such
regulations shall not be inconsistent with symbols adopted or proposed by
the Northeast Recycling Council established by the eastern regional confer-
ence of the council of state governments.
The law was to go into effect when the other members of the Northeast Recycling
Council, a regional organization comprising the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, enacted similar statutes.
However, the state revised Section 22a-255c in 1989 to proceed alone in the establish-
ment of a recycling'logo. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-255c (Historical and Statu-
tory Notes).
345. Id.
346. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:1 (1990). The statute provides:
The department of environmental services shall establish the international 3
arrow recycling emblem with a designation of whether the item on which it is
placed is recycled or recyclable material. This emblem shall be the exclusive
symbol for use on material which is authorized to be so labeled under this
chapter.
347. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:2.I (1990). The section provides:
"Recyclable material" means any material which is identified as recyclable
material by the department of environmental services in accordance with
rules adopted by the commissioner of environmental services. It shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, glass, food and beverage containers, plastic milk
containers, plastic soft drink containers, newspaper, tin coated steel cans and
steel cans, aluminum, corrugated cardboard, and mixed office paper.
The section further provides that: "Recycled material" means any material which is
produced of material with at least 50 percent post-consumer material. Id. § 149-
N:2.II.
"Post-consumer material" means only those products generated by either a
commercial entity or consumer which have served their intended end uses
and which have been separated or diverted from solid waste for the purposes
of collection, recycling, and disposition.
Id. § 149-N:2.III.
348. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:4.
349. Id. § 149-N:2.II. But see supra note 66.
350. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:3. Finally, the statute provides for a civil pen-
alty of $2,500 per day for violations. Id. § 149-N:6.
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quire legislative redrafting.35l A sticker with the logo may be placed
on products, thus decreasing the chance that conflicting standards will
necessitate changes in the labeling or marketing of a'product on a
national or regional level.35 2 A logo system further allows states to set
their own local goals. In addition, because the state will be able to
continually improve the standards, the logo program provides local
consumers with the confidence that the product is less harmful to the
environment and meets their needs.
A disadvantage, however, is that a logo denotes only products that
have reached a certain level.353 Furthermore, a logo does not allow
comparison between products.354 Moreover, because states may have
different logos, a product crossing state borders would require another
logo, thereby adding costs to businesses. The costs and hassle of
meeting different state standards could pose a serious obstacle to envi-
ronmental marketing.35 5 Administrators of the various logo programs
would have to be careful in eliminating marketing confusion by clearly
specifying exactly what the state endorses.
B. Federal Trade Commission Guidelines
The final approach to regulating environmental marketing was un-
dertaken by the FTC.3 56 As noted earlier, California and Indiana 'en-
acted safe harbors for products that met the standards promulgated by
the FTC in either rules, or guidelines in Indiana's case.357 Maine
passed a law that incorporates the FTC guidelines by reference. Prod-
351. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 368.
352. Although the sticker itself is an addition to the waste stream, its effect is negli-
gible and would produce less waste than changing the packaging of a nationally mar-
keted product.
'353. See supra note 351 and accompanying discussion.
354. E.g., the difference between a product that contains 50% recycled material will
not be directly comparable to a product containing 75% recycled material.
355. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
356. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260
(1994); see also Downs, supra note 1, at 176-79; Carl F. Patka, Of Diapers, Lawnbags,
and Landfills: The Federal Trade Commission Cracks Down on False Advertising in
the Environmental Marketplace, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP., 43 (1993); After the FTC
Guides, What?, GREEN MARKETALERT, Dec. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW,
GRMKTAL File; Businesses Get Long-Awaited 'Green' Rules, S.F. CHRON., July 29,
1992, at A4; Federal Agency Applies Limits to Companies' 'Green' Claims, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, July 30, 1992, at 48; FTC Issues 'Green' Label Guidelines, ATLANTA
CONST., July 30, 1992, at C4; The FTC Issues Its Voluntary Labeling Guidelines: A
New Era Begins, GREEN MARKETALERT, Aug. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW,
GRMKTAL File; FTC Wants Environmental Truth in Ads, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
July 29, 1992, at 7A; Michael Parrish, FTC Issues Guidelines for Green Marketing,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1992i at D1; Alex Pham, It's Not Easy Being Green: FTC Issues
Some Guidelines; Agency Clarifies Use of Environmental Terms for Products, WASH.
POST, July 29, 1992, (Financial), at 3; US FTC Issues Guidelines for Green Marketing
Claims, Bus. & ENV'T, Aug. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BUSENV File.
357. See supra notes 48-49 and 323-24 and accompanying text.
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ucts that violate the guidelines are also in violation of the Maine Un-
fair Trade Practices Act.358
The federal guidelines are not legally enforceable, since they are
not codified as rules or a statute.35 9 They were compiled as "adminis-
trative interpretations of laws administered by the [FTC] for the gui-
dance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity with legal
requirements. '' 3 ° Actually, the guidelines are based predominantly
on consent decrees.361 And since many states will use these guidelines
as a reference point, if not by law but by incorporation (as in
Maine),362 the importance of the guidelines is great indeed.36 3
There has been a general call for federal regulation, of environmen-
tal marketing.36 In fact, the Attorneys General Task Force explicitly
called for federal regulation that does not preempt state law in the
area.365 Furthermore, several bills have been introduced in Congress
in recent years.366 Despite the desire for national standards, the FTC
Guidelines are' the only successful attempt in regulating environmen-
tal marketing at the federal level. The FTC commissioners scheduled
review of their success for three years after adoption.367 It is possible
that the FTC will enact binding administrative regulations at that
time. Therefore, the likelihood that the FTC will adopt regulations
before the three-year review is completed is-minimal.
The guidelines provide explanation for the process by which envi-
ronmental claims are judged by the FTC.36 They set forth various
358. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West Supp. 1993); see also Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (West 1989 & Supp.
1993).
359. 16 C.F.R. § 260.2 ("Because the guides are not legislative rules under section
18 of the FTC Act, they are not themselves enforceable regulations, nor do they have
the force and effect of law."). But see supra notes 11 and 32-36 and accompanying
text (discussing unenforceable guidelines and the weight many companies give to such
guides).
360. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1. But see supra notes 11 and 54-58 and accompanying text
(noting the stability such compilations provide).
361. Israel, supra note 44, at 317. "A judgment entered by consent of the parties
whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or
wrongdoing. Agreement by defendant to cease activities asserted as illegal by govern-
ment (e.g., deceptive advertising practices as alleged by F.T.C.)." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARy 410 (6th ed. 1991).
362. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
363. Compare After the' FTC Guides, What?, supra note 356 (expressing the view
that the guidelines will not solve all the environmental marketing difficulties) with
The FTC Issues Its Voluntary Labeling Guidelines: A New Era Begins, supra note 356
(expressing the view that the guidelines will eliminate the substantial environmental
problems). See also Israel, supra note 44, at 317.
364. See supra notes 22 and 55. For a critique of the structural problems associated
with federal environmental marketing regulation, see Downs, supra note 1.
365. See supra notes 22 and 55.
366. See supra note 23.
367. 16 C.F.R. § 260.4; see also US FTC Issue Guidelines for Green Marketing
Claims, supra note 356.
368. 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 states:
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general principles, 369 and address specific environmental marketing is-
sues by providing examples of appropriate and inappropriate
claims.370
The FTC guidelines are certainly a helpful addition for manufactur-
ers and advertisers.371 They clarify the interpretation of federal laws
and regulations and may provide guidance on approaches taken by
Section 5 of the FTC Act makes unlawful deceptive acts and practices in or
affecting commerce. The Commission's criteria for determining whether an
express or implied claim has been made are enunciated in the Commission's
Policy Statement on Deception. In addition, any party making an express or
implied claim that presents an objective assertion about the environmental
attribute of a product or package must, at the time the claim is made, possess
and rely upon a reasonable basis substantiating the claim. These guides,
therefore, attempt to preview Commission policy in a relatively new con-
text-that of environmental claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
369. 16 C.F.R. § 260.6. The section provides the following general guide:
Overstatement of Environmental Attribute. An environmental marketing
claim should not be presented in a manner that overstates the environmental
attribute or benefit, expressly or by 'implication. Marketers should avoid im-
plications' of significant environmental benefits if the benefit is in fact
negligible.
Id. § 260.6(c). The sub-section continues:
Example 1: A package is labeled, "50% more recycled content than before."
The manufacturer increased the recycled content of its package from 2 per-
cent [sic] recycled material to 3 percent [sic] recycled material. Although the
claim is technically true, it is likely to convey the false impression that the
advertiser has increased significantly the use of recycled material.
Id.
370. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7. The examples take various factual situations and interpret
the situations in light of the guidelines. Id. This allows manufacturers a chance to see
how the guidelines operate in a substantive situation. For example:
(a) General Environmental Benefit Claims. It is deceptive to misrepresent,
directly or by implication, that a product or package offers a general envi-
ronmental benefit. Unqualified general claims of environmental benefit are
difficult to interpret, and depending on their context, may convey a wide
range of meanings to consumers. In many cases, such claims may convey
that the product or package has specific and far-reaching environmental
benefits. As explained in the Commission's Ad Substantiation Statement,
every express and material, implied claim that the general assertion conveys
to reasonable consumers about an objective quality, feature or attribute of a
product must be substantiated. Unless this substantiation duty can be met,
broad environmental claims should either be avoided or qualified, as neces-
sary, to prevent deception about the specific nature-of the environmental
.benefit being asserted.
Id. § 260.7. The following example relates to the general guide stated above:
Example 1: A brand name like "Eco-Safe" would be deceptive if, in the
context of the product so named, it leads consumers to believe that the prod-
uct has environmental benefits which cannot be substantiated by the manu-
facturer. The claim would not be deceptive if "Eco-Safe" were followed by
clear and prominent qualifying language limiting the safety representation to
a particular product attribute for which it could be substantiated, and pro-
vided that no other deceptive implications were created by the context.
371. See supra note 359.
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different states.372 Most importantly, the guidelines- are national in
scope.373
However, the guidelines have left several questions about green
marketing unanswered. Conflict'between the guidelines and state law
is one major problem, since the guidelines do not preempt state
law.374 Perhaps more importantly, the FTC does not have the exper-
tise in interpreting and substantiating. environmental claims. This is
an area where the Environmental Protection Agency clearly has more
experience and qualifications.375 Since the expertise of each agency is
needed in tracking environmental marketing, some sort of joint ap-
proach would seem necessary for adoption of extensive federal regula-
tions.376 A third problem with the federal, approach is that the
command and control methods of the federal regulatory agencies may
not allow for local solutions to their specific problems (e.g., landfills in
the Natioial Advertisers situation).377
IV. FOOD LABELING REQUIREMENTS
The problems associated with environmental marketing are not en-
tirely unique, since disseminating information is not an exact sci-
ence.378 The difficulties resulting from the ambiguity of marketing
terms are common to all forms of advertising. Indeed, there is an in-
herent tension between the consumers' desire for accurate and under-
standable information,379 and the marketers' attempt to appeal to a
mass market.
Recently, new marketing regulations were enacted affecting the
American food industry and the type of information that consumers
are given.38 0 The new regulations were mandated by the Nutritional
372. E.g., the guidelines have given a reference point and a safe harbor for Maine
and Indiana respectively, but has had little effect upon California. See supra notes 48-
49 and 324-325 and accompanying text. Some states and state agencies may also use
the FTC Guidelines as a guide to interpreting state law, or as a presumption under
state law.
373. Businesses Get Long-Awaited 'Green' Rules, supra note 356; The FTC Issues
Its Voluntary Labeling Guidelines: A New Era Begins, supra note 356.
374. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.2; Israel, supra note 44, at 327.
375. See supra note 48.
376. Id.
377. Cf. Kathleen McClain, Steel Cans Added to Recycling Program, CHARLOrrE
OBSERVER, July 3, 1992, at 1C, available in WESTLAW, Papers File (discussing local
steel can recycling program added due to local initiative).
. 378. See National Advertisers, 44 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 1994) (Noonan, J., dissent-
ing), reh'g denied, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995).
379. These divergent goals sometimes themselves present a tension.
380. John Schwartz, Read It and (Maybe) Eat; FDA Promotes New Food Label For-
mat as Major 'Health Opportunity', WASH. POST, May 3, 1994, at A8; Carole
Sugarman, How Do You Label a Kumquat?, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1990, (Food), at 1;
Carole Sugarman, Lord of the Label; Commissioner Kessler Launches His New Idea,
WASH. POST, May 4, 1994, (Food), at 1; Truth in Eating; New Labeling Will Be A Start
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Labeling and Education Act of 1990,381 and were issued by the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") in.1993.382 The new labeling re-
quirements, had two main goals: to require additional information and
to ensure that it would be easily comprehended by consumers.383
The FDA nutritional labeling regulations are the most far-reaching
attempt to regulate the labels of commercial products. For this rea-
son, it may be helpful to analyze the FDA Regulations, and use them
as a model towork from when approaching the question of environ-
mental marketing labeling requirements.3 8" A label could help eradi-
cate many of the problems associated with environmental
marketing.385 The specific problems of environmental labeling re-
quirements will be addressed in Part V.
The FDA food labeling regulations are complex, comprising 152
pages. 386 The reason for the length of the regulations is that there are
different requirements for the labeling of every type of claim that may
be made or content that may be added. In addition, the regulations
cover the entire range of food products.387 Fortunately, the informa-
tion relevant to environmental advertising comprises fewer categories,'
and these do not vary drastically from product to product.38 8 The reg-
ulations may be viewed as tracking both stylistic advertising and the.
content of claims.
A. Stylistic Requirements
The FDA Regulations begin by mandating the location of the infor-
mation panel "immediately contiguous and to the right of the princi-
pal display panel as observed by an individual facing the principal
display panel..." 389 The regulation does create exceptions for pack-
On Avoiding Health Risks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 4, 1992, at 10B, available
in WESTLAW, Papers File.
381. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter 1990 Act].
382. 21 C.F.R. § 101 (1994) [hereinafter Regulations or FDA Regulations].
383. See Colman McCarthy, Junk Food and Label Literacy, WASH. POST, May 17,
1994, at CIO.
384. Ken Miller, 'Green' Label Buying Still a Multiple Choice, Hous. POST, Nov.
28, 1993, at A30.
385. A label. can provide more information to consumers, allow manufacturers to
tout their products' attributes, and decrease the amount of time enforcement agencies
spend on tracking down misleading and deceptive claims. See infra part V; see also,
supra part III.B.
386. 21 C.F.R. § 101.
387. Sugarman, Lord of the Label, supra note 380.
388. For instance, a claim that a product contains recycled material could easily.
pertain to a glass bottle or an aluminum can. However, foods as varied as vegetable
juice, raw fruits, and spices obviously have different labelling requirements. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 101.22, 101.30, 101.42. But see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 368.2(d) (setting forth re-
cyclability requirements for various products).
389. 21 C.F.R. § 101.2. The regulation defines the principal display panel in part as:
"the part of a label that is most likely to be displayed, presented, shown, or examined
under customary conditions of display for retail sale." Id. § 101.1.
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aging that cannot meet these requirements if there is insufficient space
or no space exists at all for the label.3"
The regulations set forth the size and type of lettering for the label:
"[A]ll information appearing on the... informational panel.., shall
appear prominently and conspicuously, but in no case may the letters
and/or numbers be less than one-sixteenth inch in height .. ."I" To
ensure maximum legibility, the -FDA has developed a guide to
"graphic enhancements," suggesting the typeface and point size to be
used in the label.39 1 The guide also suggests the color that should be
used for the label, even though the color may vary according to the
product.393
The regulations then mandate the type of information required on
each label. First, the regulations require that the "identity ,of the com-
modity" be clearly specified.394 The identity of the commodity must
be either: (a) in any name required by Federal law;3 95 (b)by "[the
common or usual name of the. food;"139 6 or (c) in the absence of any
common or usual name, by "[a]n appropriately descriptive term" or a
name commonly used by the public.397 Secondly, the regulations re-
quire that the ingredients found in the food be listed by predominance
of weight in descending order.398 The regulations require that the
name of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor be placed on the
label. 399
B. Content Requirements
The regulations require food labels to provide specific nutrition in-
formation in various categories. 400 In each category, the respective
percentages of that quality must be stated on the label.401 The regula-
390. 21.C.F.R. § 101.1(a)(1)-(3). Cf. Susan Warner, New Food-Labeling Law Boon
to Lancaster Lab; Companies Must Make Clear What You Are Putting Into Your Stom-
ach, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 10, 1993, at G1 (describing increased costs to
manufacturers).,
391. 21 C.F.R. § 101.2(c). Again, exceptions are available depending on the type of
product or packaging. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.1(c)-(f).
392. 21 C.F.R. § 101 app. B.
393. Id.
394. 21 C.F.R. § 101.3(a).
395. Id. § 101.3(b)(1).
396. Id. § 101.3(b)(2).
397. Id. § 101.3(b)(3).
398. Id. § 101.4(a) (1)-(2). Ingredients below a certain threshold (two percent or
less, but the specific threshold under two percent is determinable by the company)
may be listed together, but as a separate category. Id.
399. Id. § 101.5.
400. Id. § 101.9(a). The categories include calories, calories from fat, total fat, satu-
rated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates, dietary fiber, sugars, protein, and
various vitamins and minerals. Id. § 101.9(c). The percentages of each are also listed.
Id.
401. Id. § 101.3(f).
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING'
tions supply categories that. may be voluntarily provided on the
label.4 "2
The regulations also require more stringent labeling or disclosure of
information for certain products40 3 or ingredients. 404 Importantly, the
regulations distinguish between general requirements for virtually all
products and specific requirements for those -products that require
more detailed descriptions. In addition, the regulations define the use
of terms such as "good source," "high," "more," "fortified," and
"light. '405 These terms parallel terms used in environmental market-
ing such as "environmentally-friendly," "safe for the environment," or
"better for the environment. 40 6
The most dramatic change in the recent food labeling requirements
has to do with' the new label design. "The [new food label is] the first
major change in nutrition labels since their introduction two decades
ago, the new format.., features large type and offers simple guides to
... nutritional components,"40 7 This new label design was accompa-
nied by some simple rules designed to increase the legibility and com-
prehensibility of the labels. Some of these include a "single easy-to-
read type style,"' 408 sufficient space between the lines of text4 9 and
between letters,410 various required headings, 411 and minimum type
402. The categories include calories from saturated fat, polyunsaturated fat,
monosaturated fat, potassium, soluble fiber, insoluble fiber, sugar alcohol, and other
carbohydrates. Id.
403. These specific labeling requirements are beyond the scope of this Note. For
detailed analysis of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, see Edward
Dunkelberger & Sarah E. Taylor, The NLEA, Health Claims, and the First Amend-
ment, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 631 (1993); Eric F. Greenberg, The Changing Food La-
bel: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 3 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 10
(1990); Geoffrey M. Levitt, FDA Enforcement Under the Nutrition Labeling and Edu-
cation Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 119 (1993); Jean Lyons & Martha Rumore, Food
Labeling-Then and Now, 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 171 (1994); John McCutcheon, Nutri-
tion Labeling Initiative, 49 FooD & DRUG L.J. 409 (1994); James M. Serafino, Devel-
oping Standards for Health Claims-The FDA and the FTC, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
335 (1992); Fred R. Shank, The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 47
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247 (1992); Roseann B. Termini, The Prevention of Misbranded
Food Labeling: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and Alternative
Enforcement Mechanisms, 18 OHio N.U. L. REV. 77 (1991); John M. Blim, Comment,
Free Speech and Health Claims Under The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990: Applying a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 733 (1994).
404. Id.
405. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.54-101.56; see also Carole Sugarman, Truth in Labeling, But
What About Advertising?; Controversy Over FTC's Plans to Keep Product Claims
Consistent With FDA's New Labels, WASH. POST, May 31, 1994, at Z16.
406. Miller, supra note 384.
407. Schwartz, supra note 380.
408. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d)(1)(ii)(A).
409. Id § 101.9(d)(1)(ii)(C).
410. Id. § 101'.9(d)(1)(ii)(D).
411. Id. § 101.9(d)(1)(iv).
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sizes.412 These requirements, ensure the legibility and clarity of the
information provided. 13 Other sections of the regulations continue to
provide the stylistic requirements of the new label.414 In addition, var-
ious sections regulate the misbranding of labels, mandating the truth-
fulness of the information provided on the labels.41  Since not all
ingredients are useful to human health, the regulations update label-
ing requirements for saccharin 41 6 and regulate nutrient content
claims, 417 health claims 4 18 and warning and notice statements found
on food labels. 19
Since consumer data evaluating the new labels will not be available
until 1999,420 the effect of the new regulations will not be known for
some time. However, this does not mean the regulations are a failure.
Although only time will tell, the regulations seem to be working better
than the old label requirements.
V. SOLUTION4 2 1
In creating a regulatory framework for green marketing, three in-
terested groups should be taken into account: consumers, marketers,
and the various government agencies that regulate deceptive advertis-
ing.422 The framework should strive to meet numerous goals: achiev-
ing truthful and 'accurate environmental marketing; creating an
atmosphere that provides a continuing incentive for companies to im-
prove the environmental characteristics of their products; securing
consumer confidence in environmental marketing claims; ensuring
consumers' ability to easily understand environmental marketing
claims and discern between competing products; providing consumer
access to the environmental characteristics of products; increasing the
consumers' ability to recycle products or packaging and their access to
related information; promoting products that are less harmful to the
environment; and, easing the strain of regulatory and prosecutorial
412. Id. § 101.9(d)(1)(iii).
413. See McCarthy, supra note 383.
414. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d). Various sample labels are diagrammed id.§§ 101.9(d)(11)(iii), (d)(12), (d)(13)(i), (e)(5), (j)(13)(1)-(2).
415. See, e.g., id. § 101.9(g)(4), (k).
416. Id § 101.11.
417. Id. § 101.13.
418. Id. § 101.14.
419. Id. § 101.17.
420. See McCarthy, supra note 383 (noting that the FDA would reevaluate the reg-
ulations five years after enactment).
421. Various non-regulatory solutions to the environmental marketing crisis have,
been proposed. See John J. Fried, The 'Green' "Label Becomes a Coveted
Endorsement, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 28, 1993, at Cl (discussing EPA's Energy Star
program); Jesus Sanchez, Group Will Target the Environmental Claims of Products,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1990, (Business), at 1 (discussing "Environmental Hall of
Shame").
422. Cf Welsh, supra note 45, at 999-1013 (examining deficiencies in environmental
marketing regulation). /
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agencies.423 These goals should be tempered with a respect for a
cleaner environment and the implementation of environmental goals.
One possible solution is the creation of an "Environmental Facts"
label similar to the "Nutrition Facts" label mandated by the FDA
Regulations.424 This solution has two attractive features: first, the
structure and design of the label have already been created and their
user-friendliness has already been tested;4 25 and second, the approach
is capable of meeting the goals enunciated above.426
The question of who should regulate this new label immediately
arises. The state governments cannot effectively regulate this, since
varying state requirements are at the heart of the current troubles.427
Regulatory authority by the federal government would certainly be
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, although
the political will does not seem to be present. 28
Perhaps the best alternative is to allow industry to set the initial
guidelines, so long as they create a fair and understandable guide.429
Congress could grant trade associations or industry groups authority
over this matter.43 ° In any event, the federal government would retain
423. See also Grodsky, supra note 48, at 163-92; Welsh, supra note 45, at 995-98.
424. See supra part IV.
425. For the sake of argument, it is assumed that the design of the "Nutrition Facts"
label actually increases the ability of consumers to discern nutrition values.
426. See supra part IIIA2. The allure of labeling lies in the simplicity and flexibility
of the approach. The amount of information can be easily increased or decreased,
and a standard format will drastically cut down the need for enforcement, while al-
lowing companies to advance'their message.
427. See Heidorn, supra note 56 (" 'There are some product categories where the
rules are conflicting between California and Rhode Island and you'll have to pick
which state you'll market in .... .' "); Vocabulary of Environmental Terms Proposed,
supra note 56 (" 'If they have different label laws in every state, and even some locali-
ties, it means basically that We can't tell consumers about the environmental features
of our products. .. .' ").
428. See generally TRIBE, supra note 98, at 479-81, 497-501; NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 98, §§9.1-.4, at 311-15. Given the time constraints of.enacting federal
regulations and the difficulties when federal agencies attempt to create regulations,
regulations by the federal government should be seen as a last resort. See John
Schwartz, A Healthy Amount of Verbiage to Define What's Good for You, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1994, at A24. See also supra note 23 (noting federal bills introduced to
control environmental marketing that have not passed).
429. See Barbara A. Boczar, Toward a Viable Environmental Regulatory Frame-
work: From Corporate Environmental Management to Regulatory Consensus, 6
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 291, 295 (1994).
430. See Howett, supra note 45, at 444-48 (discussing industry regulation and "po-
tential antitrust concerns in industry self-regulation"); Boczar, supra note 429, at 295
(discussing environmental self-regulating approaches). This approach is not novel.
The securities industry, attorneys, and trade associations all enjoy the privileges of
self-regulation to a greater or lesser, degree. See, e.g., Allen Blumenthal, Attorney
Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal Profession, 3 KA.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 6 (1994) (discussing attorney disciplinary system); Deborah
Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions: New York Stock Exchange, Inc., and National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.-Administration and Procedure, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW
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ultimate authority.431 Faced with the threat of federal intervention,
the groups would have a powerful incentive to create a fair guide to
environmental attributes. Furthermore, the federal government could
act as a watchdog over any abuse of power by the industry groups.
Another less formal approach would entail the industry groups de-
veloping the label on their own initiative. In conjunction with this
step, the trade associations or industry groups responsible would initi-
ate a dialogue with the FTC and the National Association of Attor-
neys General. The trade associations or industry groups would then
attempt to secure an agreement not to prosecute against claims in the
label format.432
The challenge is to create a framework that satisfies these groups
and goals. While not an easy task, as the dizzying number and styles
of. regulations attest to, the challenge nonetheless needs to be under-
taken before consumers are completely mistrustful of environmental
advertising and manufacturers are unwilling to promote environmen-
tal characteristics.433 This distrust would be harmful for everyone.
The nature of the information contained in the label would obvi-
ously have to change. The heading, similar to the "Nutrition Facts"
label, could be termed "Environmental Facts." Instead of serving
sizes, as is logical for food information, the label should provide the
environmental characteristics of the entire package. This would allow
consumers to compare packaging between similar products. In addi-
tion, a consumer would see not only the cost benefits of buying a
larger package, but the environmental benefits as well. Since many
consumers report their willingness to pay more for a product with bet-
ter environmental credentials,434 this would be an especially important
breakthrough and would allow comparison of different products on
both their cost and environmental qualifications.
The specific categories to be included in the label are a contentious
issue. Environmental attributes are not as universal as nutrition at-
AND PRACrICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, July-Oct., 1994, PLI No. B4-7072 (dis-
cusses arbitration within self-regulating securities organizations); Butler D. Shaffer, In
Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations and the Emergence of "Self Regulation ", 20 Sw.
U. L. REV. 289 (1991) (discussing self-regulation pressures in trade associations).
431. Id.
432. Note that the prosecutors and regulators would not be barred from attacking
the veracity of the claim (e.g., a claim that a product contains "50% post-consumer
recycled material" when it contains only 25% of such material), but would "be pre-
vented from attacking a claim because it does not meet the form the applicable stat-
ute envisioned (e.g., "Recycled material-seven percent.") See supra notes 280-82
and accompanying text. This latter statement would be banned under the California
statute. See supra note 253. California's legislature feared that an exemption for clar-
ifying language would easily manipulate the purpose of the statute. Id. However, so
long as the claim was in the label form, the threat of manipulation is minimal.
433. This is already happening. Despite being called the advertising wanderkind of
the 1990s, environmental advertising has caused less excitement in recent years. See
supra notes 59-63.
434. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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tributes. 435 A voluntary scheme allowing manufacturers to pick and
choose which terms to include could be easily abused. Companies
would be able to include those terms favorable to their particular situ-
ation while excluding less favorable terms. Therefore, rules must be
drawn up ensuring that if a product contains a certain material or is of
a certain type, then specific categories must be included in the prod-
uct's label.436
In formulating a list of environmental categories to be included in
the label program, a distinction should be made between categories
that necessarily require explanations and those that do not. The for-
mer category would include "degradable," "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable," "source reduction, '' 437 and "ozone-safe/friendly."
When these terms are applicable, an explanatory note should be ad-
dedin proximity to the claim and in the same size lettering.438 By its
nature, it may also be necessary to include-the term "recyclable" in
this category.439 The terms "refillable" and "compostable" are similar
in nature to "recyclable" and should be treated in the same manner.
There are two terms that should be treated differently from the pre-
ceding terms: "recycled content" 440 and "percentage packaging."
Since these terms are expressed in percentages,. they may be listed
plainly on the label with their corresponding values." 1 Another term
that could be added where applicable is "organic-pesticide free."
This term could be placed on all applicable products, and a star placed
across from the term if the product meets the definition. These terms
435. E.g., whereas virtually every food contains calories, not every product is either
"ozone-safe" or "ozone-damaging." For many products, either term would be non-
sensical and thus confusing. On the other hand, one term which should be included in
every label is "Packaging as a Percentage of Product."
436. E.g., a product which was packaged in cardboard would have to include both
the "recycled" and "recyclable" categories in its label.
437. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(f) ("a product or package has been reduced or is lower
in weight, volume or toxicity").
438. The FTC guidelines also require explanatory notes when these terms are used.
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7.
439. This is because differing parts of the product may or may not be recycled, and
in many cases additional information will be required informing consumers about the
recycling requirements. This can easily be done by designating an information hotline
that is denoted on the label.
440. Many commentators have been critical of companies that have used pre-con-
sumer waste in their calculations of recycled content. See, e.g., GREEN REPORT, supra
note 1, at 36. While it is confusing to combine these terms, consumers are still inter-
ested in the information. Consumers are also interested in the recycling practices of
the company during the manufacturing process as well. After all, if the waste were
not utilized during the manufacturing process, it would still end up in the waste
stream. In turn, the term "recycled" should be broken down into two sub-terms:
"manufacturing by-products" and "post-consumer." Consumers' confusion would
easily be cleared up if these two terms were listed side by side.
441. This is similar to the "% Daily Value" terms found in the FDA Regulations.
See supra note 402.
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would provide an easy reference point for consumers and would be
applicable to an enormous number of products.
To facilitate the verifiability of these claims, the companies that
claim that a product has certain attributes must keep a record of the
data that supports the claim. The regulations are already in place for
the FDA nutritional claims, 44 and similar regulations should not be
difficult to duplicate.
To reduce the waste that labels themselves will require, alternatives
should be considered to placing the label on the package itself. Many
labels are already crowded with a variety of information 443 required
by various laws.44" Companies will be adverse to a plan that takes up
the space for their purposes, such as package advertising and name
placement. The obvious solution is to require a label to be promi-
nently placed on the shelf in front of the product. This display could
be similar to those currently used for providing price information in
most grocery stores and supermarkets.
The use of labels will establish environmental marketing as a pow-
erful consumer tool. The flexibility and simplicity of the concept al-
lows a label to achieve goals that are difficult to achieve with
regulatory approaches. The current approaches have not met the
challenge, and a new approach needs to be taken to resuscitate envi-
ronmental consumerism from its recent languor.
CONCLUSION
Environmental marketing is an important, consumer-driven source
of progress in today's marketplace. In their attempts to eliminate
fraud, both the state and the federal governments have used blunt
tools to manage a delicate topic. Their approaches have failed to meet
the diverse goals of consumers who purchase the products, businesses
that market the products, and state regulators who keep watch over
the marketplace. The current-state statutes create difficulties for busi-
ness and give no information to the consumer. California's Statute is
especially egregious because it fails to permit qualifying language and
does not contain a functioning safe-harbor provision. These defects
render the Statute too broad to meet California's environmental goals
and, therefore, it fails the Central Hudson test as well. Consequently,
there is a great risk that consumers will lose their zeal to buy environ-
mentally safe products, if they have not done so already. These con-
flicting statutes are probably strong contributors to the decline of
environmental marketing over the past few years.
In contrast, a label program would meet the various goals of these
interested parties. The program could furnish consumers with the in-
442. 21 C.F.R. § 101.
443. See Warner, supra note 388.
444. Id.
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formation needed to make a rational choice, and would greatly ease
the burden on manufacturers endeavoring to provide purchasers with
pertinent and responsible attributes of their products. A label pro-
gram is the most effective approach for meeting these goals and
should be created based on the FDA "Nutrition Facts" labeling regu-
lations to provide flexible and efficient management of environmental
marketing.

